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THESIS

**APPLYING COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY TO AIR
BASE DEFENSE: A NEW DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK**

by

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<p>U.S. air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just the first two years of the conflict. This prompted the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations to declare in October 2004 that air base defense was one of the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the U.S. Air Force. Yet a solution exists, but not in current air base defense doctrine where the threat to air bases is presented as a conventional force or saboteur. Instead, the history of air base attacks reveals a different but consistent enemy over the last 50 years: the insurgent. Unlike conventional forces which seek decisive military victory and the destruction of the adversary's military resources, the insurgent seeks primarily and ultimately a political victory. To do this, among other efforts; the insurgent must wage an "information war" in order to expand the growth and power of the insurgent organization, often through acts of symbolic violence against targets of strategic value. As such, the air base is a leading target of choice for insurgents.</p> <p>Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the United States military – arguably the most critical terrain in the current American way of war. With each air base attack, no matter which specific tactic used, the insurgent attempts to strengthen their hold over their own center of gravity – the local population – while attacking the U.S. center of gravity – the political will of the American public. Only a base defense doctrine that targets the insurgents' center of gravity in the physical, informational, and moral spectrum will succeed at disrupting insurgent operations and protect the air base, the local population, and the U.S. center of gravity. Counterinsurgency provides a foundation for this proposed doctrine.</p>			
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NEW DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK**

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ABSTRACT

U.S. air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just the first two years of the conflict. This prompted the U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations to declare in October 2004 that air base defense was one of the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the U.S. Air Force. Yet a solution exists, but not in current air base defense doctrine where the threat to air bases is presented as a conventional force or saboteur. Instead, the history of air base attacks reveals a different but consistent enemy over the last 50 years: the insurgent. Unlike conventional forces which seek decisive military victory and the destruction of the adversary's military resources, the insurgent seeks primarily and ultimately a political victory. To do this, among other efforts; the insurgent must wage an "information war" in order to expand the growth and power of the insurgent organization, often through acts of symbolic violence against targets of strategic value. As such, the air base is a leading target of choice for insurgents.

Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the United States military – arguably the most critical terrain in the current American way of war. With each air base attack, no matter which specific tactic used, the insurgent attempts to strengthen their hold over their own center of gravity – the local population – while attacking the U.S. center of gravity – the political will of the American public. Only a base defense doctrine that targets the insurgents' center of gravity in the physical, informational, and moral spectrum will succeed at disrupting insurgent operations and protect the air base, the local population, and the U.S. center of gravity. Counterinsurgency provides a foundation for this proposed doctrine.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	5
1.	Primary Research Questions	5
2.	Secondary Research Questions.....	5
B.	METHODOLOGY	6
C.	ORGANIZATION	8
D.	BENEFITS OF STUDY.....	9
II.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF US AIR BASE DEFENSE.....	11
A.	SUMMARY	20
III.	CURRENT AIR BASE DEFENSE DOCTRINE.....	21
A.	JOINT DOCTRINE.....	21
B.	AIR FORCE DOCTRINE.....	24
C.	TECHNOLOGY	27
D.	COMMAND AND CONTROL	30
E.	AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION.....	32
F.	SUMMARY	34
IV.	INSURGENCY, TERRORISM, AND THE SYSTEM OF INSURGENCY	37
A.	PHASES OF AN INSURGENT SYSTEM	38
1.	Phase I.....	40
2.	Phase II	42
3.	Phase III.....	46
B.	PREFERENCES – THE INSURGENT CENTER OF GRAVITY	46
C.	SUMMARY	49
V.	MODELS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY	53
A.	MCCORMICK’S “MYSTIC DIAMOND” MODEL OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY.....	53
B.	PAGET’S MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN A COUNTER INSURGENCY.....	58
C.	A NEW DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE – PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE BASED ON COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELS	62
1.	Act First	65
2.	Unity of Effort	69
3.	Protection.....	70
4.	Penetration.....	75
5.	Perseverance.....	77
D.	SUMMARY	78
VI.	CASE STUDIES.....	79
A.	METHOD OF ANALYSIS.....	79
B.	CASE SELECTION CRITERIA.....	79

C.	DA NANG AIR BASE, VIETNAM.....	82
D.	TUY HOA AIR BASE, VIETNAM.....	86
E.	BASRA AIR BASE, IRAQ.....	87
F.	BALAD AIR BASE (LSA ANACONDA), IRAQ.....	89
G.	COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES USING THE NEW PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE.....	93
VII.	CONCLUSION	99
	A. TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY	103
	APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY.....	105
	APPENDIX B. PAGET'S MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY	107
	APPENDIX C. NEW PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE BASED ON A COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL*.....	111
	APPENDIX D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR AIR BASE DEFENSE 115	
	LIST OF REFERENCES	119
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	127

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Open Systems Model of Insurgency.....	39
Figure 2.	Political Preference – Behavior Model.....	49
Figure 3.	McCormick’s Model of Counterinsurgency at a National Level.....	53
Figure 4.	McCormick’s Model of Counterinsurgency at Air Base Defense/Local Level.....	54
Figure 5.	Application of the New Principles of Air Base Defense.....	98

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I. INTRODUCTION

US air bases in Iraq have been attacked over 1,000 times in just two years, raising the question: can the US Air Force (USAF) defend its expeditionary air bases?¹ Considering that all air bases in Iraq are actually Air Force camps collocated with Army camps, the more accurate question may be: can the US military defend its expeditionary air bases? Illustrating the fact that the Air Force may already know it cannot defend its air bases using its current doctrine, Lieutenant General Ronald E. Keys told a Naval Postgraduate School audience in October 2004 that air base defense (ABD) was one of the five critical problems without a solution currently facing the USAF.²

Poor base defense could be devastating to the conduct of a war and the American public's perception of the military's performance. This statement has an historical basis. It was an air base attack that precipitated the conventional force build-up in Vietnam. On November 1, 1964, small units of the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa air base with mortars and sapper teams, destroying seven aircraft and damaging eighteen more.³ The event was viewed by Washington as the first substantial attack against US forces in Vietnam and directly resulted in the conventionalization of the war as "regular" Army, Marine, and Air Force units were brought in to defend US air bases.⁴ The insurgent enemy of Vietnam is similar to the insurgent enemy of today and similar to the insurgent enemy that has been the primary enemy of air bases for the last 50 years. The insurgent seeks targets of symbolic and strategic value and that is why air bases are often a target of choice.

¹ Colonel Robert Holmes, Director of Air Force Security Forces, "Security Forces Transformation" brief to the Air Force CORONA Conference, Dec 2004.

² At the time, General Keys was the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, AF/XO.

³ Roger P. Fox, *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973*. (Washington D.C.: USAF Office of History, 1979), 11. Sapper attacks normally constituted four to six person teams that tried to penetrate through the base defense perimeter in order to detonate explosives on parked aircraft, for example, or assault a target with small arms.

⁴ Fox, 12.

Air bases are key operational and strategic terrain to the US – arguably the most critical terrain in the American way of war. USAF as well as Royal Air Force (RAF) leadership recognizes air bases as strategic terrain because they house the combatant commander’s key supporting fire assets.⁵ The importance of airpower in the modern way of war cannot be overstated. The rapid pace of maneuver warfare by special operations forces as well as Army and Marine battalions and brigades requires fire support that is responsive, long-range, precise, and lethal. Only airpower can meet these requirements. In the early stages of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, artillery support was negligible in its battlefield impact when compared to airpower.

However, the combatant commander’s dependence on airpower goes beyond just fire support but, maybe as importantly, on airlift as well. Flexible and rapid operations such as Task Force DAGGER and Operation Anaconda would have been impossible without the Air Force’s inter-theater and intra-theater airlift fleet. Additionally, most humanitarian assistance, response to natural disasters, and other Military Operations Other Than War are essentially airlift operations.

In recent years US aircraft have also become as high as payoff targets as air bases. As aircraft have become more capable and more expensive, the numbers of aircraft procured have been dramatically reduced. The result is each aircraft has practically become a strategic asset, and a strategic liability, because each aircraft carries a greater portion of national military power. Yet it is not only the link to fire support, airlift, and cost that defines the importance of air bases, it is something more critical. Air bases, at the operational level of war, are the United States’ logistical, command, and

⁵ Scott Millington (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), John Hall (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), Neal Rawlsthorne (Royal Air Force (RAF) Squadron Leader), and Thomas Miner (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK on 7-9 Mar 2005. RAF also considers air bases as strategic terrain for the same reason but by RAF doctrine defines the Ground Defense Area around an air base as under the control of the Air Base Commander. As a result, the RAF Regiment has always focused defensive operations off-base rather than on-base; however, the Regiment have enhanced their internal base defense processes recently by merging with the RAF Police. Yet the Regiment still views their primary purpose in base defense as achieving a greater situational awareness than the enemy.

informational centers of gravity. Clausewitz called a center of gravity (COG) “the hub of all power and movement” and air bases certainly fit the bill.⁶

Deployed command and control headquarters are consistently located at air bases: CENTCOM headquarters is adjacent to Al Udeid air base in Qatar; US and Multinational Force and Corps headquarters in Iraq is adjacent to Baghdad International Airport; Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) was located on Tan Son Nhut Air Base; and Taegu air base served as 8th Army’s Headquarters during the Korean War. In response, media outlets center their operations at the air bases. The result is the air base has become the focal point of the information battlespace.

This fact has not been lost on the enemy in Iraq, but it has been lost on the USAF. Insurgent and terrorist forces continually attack air bases in Iraq even though the payoff in terms of damage to air operations, numbers of wounded-in-action (WIA), and numbers of killed-in-action (KIA) are relatively minimal.⁷ The inability of the insurgent to cause major damage is because insurgents do not usually attack with decisive force but instead attack in whatever tactic or method is available to them. The preferred tactics are acts of terror such as car bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings but also often include guerrilla actions such as stand-off attacks and ambushes. These tactics allow the insurgent to influence the US center of gravity – the political will of the US public, and protect the insurgent’s center of gravity – the local population, while remaining nearly invisible to the decisive force of the US military. The insurgent air base attack, therefore, is more so a form of information warfare. Since air operations are normally disrupted little by the insurgent attacks, the USAF often views air base defense as successful even when under consistent enemy fire.⁸ To the USAF and the US military in general, it’s not worth the

⁶ Antulio Echevarria II. “Center of Gravity: Recommendations for Joint Doctrine”. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 35 (2004): 13-14. Cited in Andrew F. Krepinevich testimony before House Committee on Armed Services, *Measuring Success in the Iraq*. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2005, 2. DoD Definition is “those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight.”

⁷ Air base attacks in Iraq, though more numerous, have not really come close to approaching the ferocity of the VC/NVA attacks in Vietnam. Fox documented several multi-battalion assaults and standoff attacks of more than 200 rockets/mortars against air bases in Vietnam.

⁸ This is a reference to the current air base attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.

costs of interdicting or pursuing the insurgents, because of the relatively minor physical damage the insurgents cause to the air bases and USAF resources.

Insurgents could affect far more casualties by putting more effort into suicide car-bombings and improvised-explosive device (IED) ambushes. The reason the insurgents do not is because the air base attacks have strategic impact. The insurgents attack because, as the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual (2003) points out, small wars are best understood as "information wars".⁹ As the informational center of gravity in operational terms, attacks against an air base can directly influence the US strategic center of gravity – the will of the American public.¹⁰ Therefore, the air bases attacks may appear to be harassment attacks at the tactical level but are informational attacks at the strategic level.

The US does not view the attacks as informational in nature but instead views the attacks as trying to achieve a tactical objective: harassment. The US believes the insurgent values the same thing that the US military values, its military resources. The insurgent, in this conventional view, seeks to maximize the physical damage to US airpower in order to somehow defeat US airpower. And if physical damage is the goal of the insurgent, then the US military, and the Air Force in particular, assumes the insurgent will want to attack the resources through a ground assault or a saboteur because at close range the insurgent has a much higher percentage of success in destroying US resources. The Air Force than applies an engineering or technical solution to the base defense. This technical solution often centers on stopping an enemy's conventional ground attack and insider threat with fields of fire, large response forces, massed technology, hierarchical command structure, barriers, fences, checkpoints, facility hardening, and identification systems. However, these sound and functional measures predominantly assist only in limiting damage and in the base recovery after attack. These USAF actions are not proactive in nature and do not prevent, deter, or disrupt air base attacks.

⁹ United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual (Draft)*, 2004, 53. Cited in Christopher Ford, "Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency". *Parameters*, Summer. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Us Army War College, 2005, 43.

¹⁰ Krepinevich, Testimony Before Congress, 2.

The consequences of this apparent indifference and ignorance are significant. Consider a humanitarian, stabilization, or peacekeeping mission that might not have the political importance of Iraq, a single significant air base attack could result in mission cancellation and a political embarrassment for the United States.

If the USAF did understand the importance of air bases in the information war and the nature of an insurgent threat then why would the Air Force counter this threat with a base defense doctrine based on a conventional and internal threat instead of a flexible, unconventional, and distributed effort? The answer is because USAF leadership does not understand insurgency and has yet to see how the USAF's air base defense strategy is helping *lose* the information war. Yet to win this information war, the USAF will have to implement a counterintuitive air base defense doctrine: base defense not centered on the air base but on the physical, political, and informational battle space of the local area. This new approach to air base defense not only counters the insurgent threat symmetrically but also plays to the primary strength of USAF security forces: a police background.

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Primary Research Questions

Based on case and threat analysis, what tactics, techniques, and procedures of air base defense are most effective?

2. Secondary Research Questions

What is the threat to US/Allied air bases?

What is the enemy objective(s) of air base attacks?

What has been the USAF's historical doctrine for countering the threat?

What has been the impact of this USAF doctrine on the enemy?

What impact does USAF technology have on enemy tactics?

What models of conflict best account for the enemy tactics and enable effective base defense operations?

What historical case studies demonstrate effective strategies to countering the threat?

B. METHODOLOGY

In this study, I used historical data and contemporary information that led me to discover that the principal enemy of the expeditionary air base has not changed for the last 60 years and will not for the foreseeable future – the insurgent. As part of my methodology, I do not distinguish between the insurgent and terrorist and in doing so accept the arguments of Ariel Merari in his essay, *Terrorism as a Strategy for Insurgency*. Merari’s essay emphasizes the role of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency and concludes that the mode of struggle adopted by insurgents is dictated by circumstances rather than by choice, and that whenever possible, insurgents use concurrently a variety of strategies of struggle.¹¹ Terrorism, as a form of insurgency, is practically always one of these modes.¹² Therefore, throughout this work I will use the terms “insurgent” and “terrorist” interchangeably.

I reviewed the history of joint and USAF air base defense and air base defense doctrine. I discovered that historical and current air base defense doctrine as incapable of countering the insurgent foe. Since the current doctrine was insufficient against the insurgent, I researched other models of unconventional and counterinsurgency conflict and found the models very applicable to base defense since both strive to achieve the same thing – local security.¹³ I used these models to develop new air base defense principles to counter the insurgent threat. I then researched case studies that demonstrate the positive effect of unconventional air base defense plans and use the new air base defense principles to evaluate the cases to show how effective the principles are in assessing and predicting air base defense performance.

For the purpose of this thesis, I evaluate air base success based primarily on the level of enemy activity in the vicinity of air bases (ground attacks – standoff and penetration, convoy ambushes, kidnappings, hijackings, etc.). In this way, I accept and

¹¹ Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency”. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter (1993): 213. Retrieved on 16 Jul 2005 from <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/intrel/research/cstpv/pdffiles/Terrorism%20as%20a%20Strategy.pdf>

¹² Ibid.

¹³ I did reject counterinsurgency models that supported the use of brutal tactics. Although these tactics may be effective, it would be impossible to implement such a strategy without destroying the American public’s support.

assume that for the insurgent, the act and impact of symbolic violence is still the main avenue that the insurgent group uses to announce their power, intention, and capacity for achieving their political goals, just as it was for the Anarchists over a century ago.¹⁴ Further, I examine only cases where the adversary is ground-bound, not threats to air bases that are aerial in nature (aircraft, paratroopers, etc.). In my analysis I also do not consider operational and strategic threats to air bases in the form of ballistic missiles or nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

The case studies and analytical models are then used to develop a new doctrinal framework for air base defense. I found the New Principles of Air Base Defense to be descriptive and predictive of a successful defense. I believe the counterinsurgent tactics would be effective in an environment like Iraq, in a smaller contingency such as Bosnia, and also on the Korean peninsula. In Korea, North Korea sleeper agents and special forces units could be disrupted and destroyed before being able to mount effective attacks against air bases using these New Principles. And if the North Korean units separate themselves from South Korean populations in order to prevent being exposed than the North Korean units become vulnerable to the full technological and firepower advantage of the US military.

My research builds on the previous work of Roger Fox and Alan Vick as well as interviews with USAF and US Marines Corps Vietnam and Iraq veterans, members of the United Kingdom Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment, El Salvador Air Force, Pakistani Army, and law enforcement personnel. My research also draws upon my own experience in conducting air base defense operations in multiple geographic regions, to include Panama, Peru, Korea, Jordan, and Afghanistan. Further, I have supported air base defense operations through joint operations centers or prisoner/detainee missions in Cuba, Turkey, and Iraq.

¹⁴ Merari, 232. This symbolic violence is otherwise known as *Propaganda of the Deed*. Originally an anarchist belief, first espoused by Peter Kropotkin, that promoted bold actions by one person will inspire action by others.

C. ORGANIZATION

In Chapter II, I give a historical account of air base defense and the threat to air bases from World War II to the present. Particular emphasis is placed on how the World War II and Cold War models have remained pervasive in the USAF up to the present day and how this has had a detrimental effect on air base defense operations. Instead, a proper analysis of air base attack data shows the threat to air bases not as conventional forces or Cold War saboteurs but unconventional insurgents and terrorists. In Chapter III, I outline the five major problems with air base defense today. The five problems are Joint doctrine, Air Force doctrine, the use of technology, the structure of air base defense command and control, and the organization of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation. In Chapter IV, I present an explanation of the nature of insurgency and describe the system of growth employed by an insurgency in order to grow and achieve some political outcome. Moreover, I explain that insurgency as a political, not a military, endeavor that cannot be combated with conventional military tactics. Instead, I come to the conclusion that the theories of counterinsurgency provide the most sound basis for designing a capable air base defense because at its core, counterinsurgency is a fight to maintain local security – the same challenge that faces air base defense. In Chapter V, I examine two models of counterinsurgency, Gordon McCormick's and Julian Paget's, to uncover the essential principles of what tactics are most effective in defeating an insurgent threat and attaining local security. I then restructure these principles for application in an air base defense environment and present these New Principles of Air Base Defense as a new basis for doctrine.

In Chapter VI, I present case studies of the two most significant US conflicts where air base attacks were a major enemy focus: Vietnam and Iraq. I apply an analysis of each case study using the New Principles of Air Base Defense presented in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VII is my concluding chapter where I summarize my analysis of air base defense and the need for new principles of air base defense that are more applicable to the insurgent threat. I also identify areas for further research.

For those that read this study, I recommend reading it in its entirety to ensure the understanding of the nature of the threat to air bases; the US military's response to this

threat; why this response is unable to counter the threat; and how applying the theories of counterinsurgency provide the best method for defending an air base and defeating a local insurgency. If the reader is well-versed on the history of air base defense than Chapter II would be repetitive and could be skipped. The same is true of Chapter III for those readers who have a deep understanding of the current air base defense doctrine and tactics employed by the US military. Chapter IV is unique in that it weaves theories of insurgency by Andrew Krepinevich and integrates them with Martha Crenshaw's theories of terrorism but those readers with a background in the study of insurgency could skim Chapter IV. Chapters V-VII, however, must be read in their entirety as they breakdown the counterinsurgent theories and develop essential principles to apply to the air base defense environment. These principles are then evaluated with historical case studies.

D. BENEFITS OF STUDY

Air base defense (ABD) is one of the most important defensive operations for the American military. Air bases are the center of command, logistics, and information for the range of conflict from Operations Other Than War to Nuclear Warfare. Military relief to Rwanda in 1994 was flown into an air base in Uganda guarded by US and Ugandan security forces and was directed from the Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois. If nuclear war were to commence tomorrow, most of it would be implemented from USAF bases and directed from US Strategic Command at Offutt AFB. The Iraq war is certainly no exception to the centrality of airpower.

The invasion of Iraq was directed from a location adjacent to Al Udeid Air Base (AB), aircraft from numerous Southwest Asia air bases provided more close support fire than land artillery (for the first time in warfare), and the first bases established were air bases (at Basra and Tallil) so cargo and personnel could flow quickly to the front. Further, one of the first high-profile enemy operation was the damaging of a contract cargo aircraft with a surface-to-air missile flying into Baghdad in November 2003.¹⁵ And with US Army and Marine casualties rising from convoy ambushes in late 2004, the USAF expanded airlift operations in Iraq and eliminated the need for hundreds of

¹⁵ "US Military Plane Hit by Missile on Takeoff from Baghdad", (December 2003). Retrieved on 22 Jul 2005 from <http://www.spacewar.com/2003/031210145216.zt66p66d.html>

convoys – casualties dropped.¹⁶ What does this mean? Simply that, command and control, firepower, and maneuverability in the US military are synonymous with air operations, and this makes air bases the focus of both U.S. and enemy attention.

If air bases are the bastions of US power, then if they are under attack, what message is being sent to the local populace? To the US public? It is a message of strength for the insurgent and weakness for the US. This serves the insurgent in two vital ways: it strengthens the insurgent's hold of his own center of gravity (the local population) and attacks the US operational center of gravity (the air base) and strategic center of gravity (the American public). As a result, the US military (in particular, USAF) must be able to defend air bases from attack not only to protect resources and personnel but to win the information battle.

¹⁶ Eric Schmidt. "US Convoys Go Airborne". *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, December 15, 2004. Retrieved on 22 Jul 2005 from http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041215/news_1n15convos.html. It should be noted that initially these actions reduced US killed, but US casualties have risen back to a level slightly above those of Jan 2004-Oct 2004 although still below the numbers of Nov 2004 – Jan 2005 that initially sparked the increased airlift to reduce convoys. As other data has shown, is that the insurgents have gotten more efficient at bombings, small arms ambushes, and stand-off attacks. In addition, Iraqi Police and Army (including National Guard) casualties have steadily risen from 109 in Jan 2005 to over 300 in Jul 2005. Casualty data was retrieved on 22 Jul 2005 from <http://icasualties.org/oif> and correlates with open source data compiled for a J-3 briefing, *Top Five Most Deadly Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures as of 1 Apr 2005*.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF US AIR BASE DEFENSE

Air base ground assaults (and, therefore, air base defense) is ultimately linked to the air power theories of Douhet and Mitchell that extolled a key to air superiority was to take advantage of the vulnerability of the enemy's aircraft on the ground. Simply, aircraft are much easier to kill on the ground than in the air. However, it wasn't until World War II that the assault of airfields became an essential component in conventional operations. The Japanese initiated attacks on the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia by first bombarding and then capturing airfields. From 1944 to 1945 the Japanese executed a massive offensive in China to overrun the eastern air bases used by Major General Claire L. Chennault's Flying Tigers.¹⁷ The battle of Midway, which was one of the most critical Naval battles of WWII, started as a Japanese attack against the Navy and Marine air base defenders on Midway Island in order to seize the runway facilities. The German actions in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France during its 1940 offensive and the assault on Crete in 1941 were all efforts to use paratroops and infantry to capture existing Allied air bases for use in Axis air and ground offensives.¹⁸ The legendary American island-hopping campaign in the Pacific theater was essentially a calculated effort to capture existing airfields, or terrain to establish airfields, in order to attack other Japanese-held islands, mainland Japan, and the Japanese fleet. Further, one of the most famous US operations during WWII was "Merrill's Marauders" assault and capture of the Myitkina airfield, the only all-weather runway in Burma.¹⁹ In response to the focus on air bases as primary targets of conventional operations, air base defense became a pressing need.

Air base defense in World War II emphasized the need for capable and substantial conventional defenses comprised of air defense artillery, conventional (i.e., infantry) ground defense forces, and passive defenses such as protective shelters for aircraft. This

¹⁷ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 3.

¹⁸ Fox, 2; Alan Vick, *Snakes in the Eagle's Nest*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 21-33.

¹⁹ Ronald Spector, "The Road to Myitkina," in *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times*, edited by John Arquilla (New York: University Press of America, 1996).

perception assumes a conventional opponent capable of air attack and conventional ground assaults. Besides for the unconventional tactics employed by the British Special Air Service in North Africa, the perception of a conventional threat to air bases was correct.²⁰

The British established the first dedicated air base defense force in February 1942.²¹ The Royal Air Force Regiment came into being mainly due to the debacle at Maleme, Crete where “divided command” of defense forces led to the loss of two airfields and then the entire island to the Germans.²² The U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) followed suit later that same year with the establishment of 296 air base security battalions.²³ Both the RAF and USAAF similarly viewed the chain of command of the base defense units – all base defense forces were the responsibility of the air base commander. Each force was also composed of static units and mobile units that were organized to intercept and flank attacking forces. However, by mid-1943, the decreased threat of invasion, the air supremacy of the Allies, and the lack of ground attacks by Axis forces against Allied airfields resulted in the deactivation of both British and US air base defense units. By war’s end, the US would deactivate all air base ground defense forces. The British took a different view and maintained the RAF Regiment as part of a “balanced Air Force” and, as a result, the RAF Regiment would see action in the UK’s post-war colonial insurgencies.²⁴

²⁰ Vick, 56-65; During the vital timeframe between just prior to the First Battle of El Alamein in June 1942 (where the offensive of Rommel’s *Afrika Corps* was first stopped) and the Second Battle of El Alamein in October 1942 (where *Afrika Corps* suffered its first and decisive defeat), the SAS were able to destroy 241 Luftwaffe aircraft that were to support Rommel’s ground operations. In June 1942 alone, the SAS destroyed eight percent of Luftwaffe aircraft in North Africa. The air base attacks not only destroyed aircraft but forced the redistribution of resources (soldiers and weapons) to the air base defense mission and the reduction of sorties by the Luftwaffe. These destructive and harassing attacks were critical in the Allies achieving air superiority over the battlefields of North Africa in late 1942 and leaving *Afrika Corps* without the ability to use *blitzkrieg* air-ground tactics against the Allies.

²¹ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 3. The RAF Regiment peaked at about 85,000 personnel during WWII.

²² Michael D. Bean, “United States Security Forces in an Era of Terrorist Threats” (master’s thesis, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1999), 21.; A.C. Carlson, *Air Base Defense*. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University), 2.

²³ Fox, 3.

²⁴ Fox, p.4.; Wayne Pursuer, “A Historical Perspective and Vision for the 1990’s” (master’s thesis, Air War College, 1990), 7.

However in 1947, the United States Air Force (USAF) became a separate service. As part of being a separate service, the USAF became responsible for its own base defense. And even though the Army-Air Force Agreement of 1947 and the Key West Agreement of 1948 did not *specifically* spell out the Air Force's air base defense responsibility or how air base defense would tie-in with the Army's area security mission, the USAF's responsibility for its own air base defense was implied in both documents.²⁵

The Korean War did little to alleviate this vagueness. USAF took it upon itself to defend its bases by assigning the Air Police as the main air base defense force. Starting with less than 10,000 personnel in 1950, the Air Police expanded to 39,000 by the end of 1952 but the Air Police had no doctrinal guidance on how to employ forces in air base defense.²⁶ The USAF did not publish guidance on base defense until March 1953 and even then regarded "sustained ground defense operations" as a task the USAF was not prepared to take on.²⁷

Even though in 1953, Air Force Regulation 355-4, *Defense – Local Ground Defense of Air Force Installations*, defined the responsibility of the installation commander to provide protection of air bases from infiltration, guerrilla warfare, civil disturbance, and airborne, seaborne, or ground attack, this approach to air base defense needed large numbers of airmen not routinely assigned as Air Police to take up defensive fighting positions.²⁸ Air Police duties in air base defense were outlined as: 1) providing a reconnaissance or observation screen to permit other personnel to continue normal duties until the last possible moment; 2) combat patrolling against guerrilla, partisan, or irregular forces; 3) perform as a mobile ground fighting unit; and 4) assist in organizing

²⁵ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 4; In 1984, Joint Security Agreements 8 and 9 between the USAF and Army would outline more on responsibilities for security in the "rear area" but still did not identify a process for how areas of responsibility would be delineated, only that the Army would do it. This is essentially how it remains in Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*, 10 Sep 2001 and Joint Publication 3-10.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense*, 23 Jul 1996

²⁶ Fox, 4; Air Police concentrated on enforcement of the law and UCMJ standards.

²⁷ Fox, 5; Bean, "Era of Terrorist Threats," 24; Air Force Regulation 355-4, *Defense – Local Ground Defense of Air Force Installations*, 3 Mar 1953.

²⁸ AFR 355-4, 2.

the defenses of installation and the training of personnel.²⁹ The doctrine of AFR 355-4, in actuality, was sound in most aspects except in its implementation. The ABD tasks in AFR 355-4 were an “emergency function” to be executed upon the attack of the enemy.³⁰ The assumption is that the enemy guerrilla force would be detected in enough time for the Air Police and other airmen to assume their base defense fighting positions. Without regard to the fact that most Air Police and nearly all airmen were wholly untrained to perform this mission, the entire concept provided the enemy such a major advantage in time and initiative that effective defense would be extremely difficult. This was known at the time and expressed by U.S. Air Force Colonel A.C. Carlson in 1952:

Air Force bases and ancillary units are static or semi-static, and the initiative for attack is invariably with the enemy who can choose his time and method of attack. In many instances, the first intimation of action is the explosion which destroys aircraft, vital facilities, or the opening of fire on personnel.³¹

The vulnerability of air bases in Korea may be best illustrated by the Far East Air Forces’ (FEAF) own report in 1953 that relayed effective security for air bases in Korea was never achieved and that plans were never coordinated to deal with the threat of 35,000 North Korean guerrilla fighters operating in the allies’ rear area.³² In fact, most Air Police were detailed for anti-theft/pilferage missions that correlated more with the Air Police’s peacetime duties than that of the threat. Fortunately for the USAF, the guerrilla forces never attacked air bases in Korea. This was a missed opportunity for the North Koreans since disruption of air-to-ground support and air transport for UN ground forces could have made an impact at the negotiating table.³³

When the Korean War ended, the USAF dismantled air base defense forces just as the Army Air Corps had done at the end of WWII. Some Air Force leaders recognized

²⁹ AFR 355-4, 1.

³⁰ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 5-6; AFR 355-4, 1.

³¹ Carlson, 9; Bean, 19

³² Far East Air Force Report on the Korean War, “Guerrilla Warfare in Korea”. FEAF CADJ No. 23973, vol. 2 (September 1953): 132-135; Fox, 6. Amazingly, there are no reports of the North Korean guerrillas ever attacking an air base in South Korea during the war.

³³ Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*. (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983) 373-394.

this might have been a mistake; however, the needs of the “new look” military required a dramatic reduction in Air Police personnel. The “new look” military was a reduced force that relied heavily on strategic nuclear forces and did not view limited wars like Korea as the probable future venue for US military forces. It also maximized the use of main operating bases and required little use of forward bases that more often presented complicated air base defense challenges.

Under this strategic direction, a 1957 Air Staff study assessed AFR 355-4 as “impractical,” “unmanageable,” and concerned with an “implausible [guerrilla] threat” and asserted that “quality base defense could best be achieved by the Internal Installation Security Program [AFR 205-5].”³⁴ AFR 205-5 was the guiding regulation for air base security in CONUS and Europe. It concentrated on protecting USAF assets from sabotage through strict enforcement of personnel and vehicle circulation control. The concept stressed fixed posts and physical security barriers to secure assets critical to combat operations.³⁵ Point defense was established at the perceived target of the enemy attack – the critical resource (an aircraft or command and control facility). Freedom of maneuver was granted to the enemy, on and off-base, in the belief that damage could be minimized and the enemy defeated. However, the concept of AFR 205-5 hinged on two major assumptions.

1. The enemy wants to damage/destroy *what the USAF views* as critical assets.
2. The enemy will attack using short-range, direct fire weapons such as rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, etc.

These assumptions are still prevalent today and are a major reason why air base defense, beginning in Vietnam, has been largely unsuccessful: the insurgent does not have to target critical US resources or use direct fire weapons to win the information war. And even though frequency of air base attacks and the intensity of the combat are a challenge for the insurgency, the insurgent only needs to attack to have a chance at victory.

³⁴ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 8.

³⁵ Air Force Regulation 205-5, *Security – Installation Security System*, 16 November 1959, 3.

The point defense of critical assets was designed to secure against saboteurs, spies, and small subversive forces such as undercover communist agents. Although, no communist subversive force had yet attacked USAF resources, this was the threat the USAF accepted.³⁶ It is possible, but undocumented, that the USAF *wanted* the saboteur to be the threat and not the “implausible” guerrilla threat because by doing so the USAF was able to find a threat it could reasonably counter and limit expenditure on non-operational resources.

The USAF’s focus on internal defense and the US military’s vague guidance on external base defense actions may have served the “new look” military but lacked relevance once the US seized the mission of counterinsurgency in response to Khrushchev’s declaration of Soviet support for “wars of national liberation” in 1961 and Ho Chi Minh’s announcement of his intention to reunify Vietnam in 1960.³⁷

On November 1, 1964, small units of the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa air base with mortars and sapper teams, destroying seven aircraft and damaging eighteen.³⁸ The attack was viewed by Washington as the first against US forces in Vietnam and directly resulted in the conventionalization of the war as “regular” Army, Marine, and Air Force units were initially brought in to defend US air bases. The Vietnam War eventually ended with 475 documented attacks against US/South Vietnamese (GVN) air bases that

³⁶ This is not to assert that there was no threat of Soviet spies during the 1950’s as there were arrests made within the Defense Department and the rest of the government throughout the Cold War. However, with the exception of Robert Hansen, the FBI spy, the number of spy cases has dropped off since the end of the Cold War.

³⁷ Robert S. McNamara, “United States Policy in Vietnam,” (1964), cited in Department of State Bulletin (April 13, 1964). Retrieved on 4 Aug 2005 from <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/ps3.htm>. Thomas Reeves, *A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy*. (Pittsburgh, PA: Three Rivers Press, 1997), 411. Before ever taking office in 1961, President Kennedy was zealously committed to counterinsurgency in a belief that it was a major component in the struggle of east versus west and in stopping the “domino theory” of communist expansion. Although his views predate the announcements of Khrushchev and Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam provided the first opportunity for Kennedy’s administration to use counterinsurgency as a weapon in the fight against communism.

³⁸ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 173; the attack destroyed five USAF and two RVN aircraft, damaged fifteen USAF and three RVN aircraft, killed four USAF airmen, and wounded 30 others.

resulted in 100 aircraft destroyed, 1,203 aircraft damaged, 309 service members killed, and 2,206 wounded.³⁹

Roger Fox, in his seminal work *Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam: 1961-1973*, noted that the Army had the initial mission of external base defense in Vietnam. However, the Army quickly abandoned the mission to poorly trained South Vietnamese Army units in order to execute offensive operations. General Westmoreland denied the use of ground forces in a static defense in a December 1965 letter because this would “cripple decisive offensive operations and delay enemy defeat.”⁴⁰ General Westmoreland needed the Army and Marine units, sent to defend US bases, for a conventional campaign he felt would end the war. His orders stated that “all service units and all forces of whatever service finds themselves without infantry protection]…[will be organized, trained and exercised to perform the defensive and security functions which I have just discussed]…[I reiterate that their participation in self-defense is not an optional matter, but an urgent necessity”.⁴¹

Though General Westmoreland’s reasoning was sound, it did demonstrate a lack of commitment to the air base defense mission that is still present today. Strangely, USAF leadership determined that Westmoreland’s letter required air base commanders to provide “all feasible internal security for self-defense actions” which re-enforced the *internal* actions (i.e., AFR 205-5) the USAF security police were already doing even though the Army’s *external* security had just evaporated.⁴² This conventional, internally-focused approach resulted in air base defense operations that never disrupted the enemy. As a result, the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were able to operate

³⁹ Fox, 172-208; Vick, *Snakes*, 114-157. Of the totals, RVN aircraft and personnel accounted for 25 aircraft destroyed, 305 aircraft damaged, 154 service members killed, and 504 wounded.

⁴⁰ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 27.

⁴¹ Fox, 29.

⁴² Fox, 28.

through the population with near impunity in the vicinity of most air bases for much of the war.⁴³

Designed to identify and stop a saboteur, the USAF's internal control measures and static posts *did prove* to be very effective in defeating saboteur and sapper attacks but ineffective in combating the VC/NVA who chose to attack air bases with mortars and rockets.⁴⁴ Further, Air Force base commanders had little influence on how security operations by the South Vietnamese were performed off the installation. Even when opportunity presented itself to impact security off-base, most USAF commanders chose to restrict patrolling by USAF forces.⁴⁵ Besides for forfeiting any chance to counter the VC, the USAF also voluntarily chose to ignore the threat by restricting the development of any real overt intelligence gathering mechanisms that patrolling could have at least initiated.

How was the US military, and USAF in particular, ignorant of the threat? Most critically, that the motivation for the VC/NVA's air base attacks was interpreted by the USAF as the VC/NVA's attempt to destroy aircraft and harass operations in order to disrupt USAF missions such as ROLLING THUNDER.⁴⁶ This interpretation was wrong. It was not lost on the VC/NVA that US operations such as ROLLING THUNDER were ineffective and actually helped empower the VC by isolating much of the South Vietnamese peasant population that were often the inadvertent target of the bombings.⁴⁷ Moreover, the VC also had few illusions that they had the capability to gravely disrupt US sortie generation. Bien Hoa AB and Da Nang AB alone had approximately 900

⁴³ Fox's and Vick's data on air base attacks supports this conclusion. Fox and Vick recount only three successful saboteur attacks from a sleeper agent. All other attacks were initiated from an off-base location to include thirteen sapper team attacks that penetrated the base perimeter. However, what is unknown is how many sapper teams were scattered by local friendly forces or from the fire of perimeter defense positions before reaching the base perimeter.

⁴⁴ Vick, *Snakes*, 128-155.

⁴⁵ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 79-110 and 155-168.

⁴⁶ Vick, 9-19 and 105-109.

⁴⁷ Dennis Drew, "Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure," (no date). Retrieved on 6 Sep 2005 from <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew2.htm>

aircraft just between the two bases and the VC most often attacked in small units with limited firepower.⁴⁸ Why would the VC/NVA attack the air bases?

The attacks were low-threat opportunities for the VC/NVA to send a message to affect the centers of gravity: the South Vietnamese civilians in the vicinity of the base, the operations of the air base, and the will of the American public in general. This message demonstrated that the VC/NVA was capable of challenging the US in its own stronghold (i.e., the air base) and conveyed an image of strength, perseverance, and audacity.⁴⁹ Certainly destroying aircraft and killing American GI's were prime secondary benefits but it was the transmission of the message that was the strategic focus of the attacks.⁵⁰

However, when the Vietnam ended, the US military refocused on organizational needs, and reemphasized the doctrine of offensive, conventional operations that had become the US military's "comfort zone". The USAF's approach to ABD after Vietnam was no different from the rest of the military. The USAF refocused security based on point defense of critical resources and the threat of Cold War saboteurs and in doing so avoided challenges to the established doctrine, organization, and manpower allocations that reorganizing to counter a VC/NVA-type threat would have certainly entailed. Even though since Vietnam insurgent attacks against US or allied air bases have occurred in Puerto Rico, Beirut, El Salvador, Somalia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Peru, and, most recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the USAF has essentially remained faithful to its conventional doctrine of point defense of critical resources.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Vick, 91. Vick's data shows that the vast majority of stand-off attacks fired 10 or less rounds. This allowed the VC to get away and for the VC to send their message that they could challenge the U.S. for control of the US's stronghold: the air base.

⁴⁹ Vick, *Snakes*, viii. The air base attacks in Vietnam were low-threat because of the lack of a coherent off-base security operation resulted in 96% of 472 air bases to be stand-off attacks. This means that *at least* 96% of enemy air base attacks were unopposed.

⁵⁰ Vick, 91. Vick's data shows that the vast majority of stand-off attacks fired 10 or less rounds. This allowed two things: first, for the VC to get away and, second, for the VC to send its message.

⁵¹ This point is reinforced in Chapter III.

A. SUMMARY

Analyzing the history of air base defense, an important conclusion becomes clear: the insurgent is the primary threat to air bases, not the Cold War saboteur or conventional ground force. Insurgents attack air bases because the attacks can greatly influence three centers of gravity simultaneously:

1. Insurgent Strategic COG – *the population*, who view air base attacks as a sign of insurgent strength and US weakness or lack of resolve.
2. US Strategic COG – *American public*, who often see attacks against air bases as signs of the futility of US missions. Air base attacks of great intensity and/or great frequency could force the escalation or cancellation of the entire US mission.
3. US Operational COG – *the air base itself*, as the US military's command, informational, and logistical focal point attacks against air bases are symbols of US power.

Against this insurgent threat, the Air Force has focused base defense efforts on internal security and point defense of critical resources in the belief that insurgents value the same resources as the Air Force and that the insurgents will attack using ground tactics. Needless to say, this approach has been of marginal value when insurgents did chose to attack. Further, the Air Force has normally relegated external security of air bases to the Army whose dedication to defending air bases has been weak. Air base defense does not provide the Army the large conventional battles or opportunities for units larger than a battalion to maneuver effectively. These are the missions for which the Army has planned for and trained for and wants.

However, after the Vietnam War where an insurgent force continually threatened air bases, the USAF chose to return to the Cold War view of threats to air bases even though the insurgent threat remained.

III. CURRENT AIR BASE DEFENSE DOCTRINE

If one performs a cursory review of joint and USAF air base defense doctrine, it appears the US military and the USAF seemed to have learned the lessons of Vietnam as it pertains to countering the insurgent threat. However, five key problems become clearly evident when the Joint and Air Force doctrine is analyzed in detail.

A. JOINT DOCTRINE

First, the overriding Joint publications concerning air base defense (Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*, and Joint Publication 3-10.1. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense*), are clearly based on a conventional model of warfare. The mere mention of “rear area” communicates an assumption of a linear, contiguous battlefield.⁵² If anything, the US experience in Vietnam and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan should have removed this perception. The insurgent battlefield is one that has “no flanks, no rear, or, to put it otherwise, it is front all round.”⁵³

The defense of a base is seen as an exercise in conventional maneuver warfare. Base commanders are responsible for security of their bases out to the base’s legal perimeter (i.e., internal security responsibility). Joint Publication 3-10.1 does advocate patrolling beyond the base perimeter; however, the publication provides no method of coordinating areas of responsibility and operations with the elements doctrinally given the responsibility for the external security of the rear area bases: the Army’s “mobile response force (MRF)” and “tactical combat force (TCF)”. The MRF is normally a mounted force of platoon to company strength that patrols the rear area searching for enemy forces or responding to enemy force attacks. The mounted tactics of the MRF and the nature of periodic patrolling will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the MRF to detect insurgent activity. The TCF, on the other hand, is larger (normally battalion-sized) and its main responsibility is to engage and defeat forces attacking bases. The TCF

⁵² David Briar, “Sharpening the Eagle’s Talons: Assessing Air Base Defense,” *Air & Space Power Journal*, Fall (2004). Retrieved on 6 Jul 2005 from http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NXL/is_3_18/ai_n6361638

⁵³ E.D. Swinton, *The Defence of Duffer’s Drift*. (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group) 47.

concept is a response to conventional threats to air bases, such as the battalion-sized assaults that Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut faced during the Tet Offensive in 1968.⁵⁴ However, since an insurgency is normally exemplified by acts of terror and hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, what exactly is the response force and tactical combat force going to be counterattacking against? Joint Publications 3-10 and 3-10.1 have no response.

This is not a new problem. If an enemy fights in a way not defined by doctrine, then air base defense typically suffers. This is particularly true since the assistance doctrinally provided by the Army to air base defense is a conventional tactical combat force with the mission of defeating conventional enemy forces.⁵⁵ This in no way suggests that the Army has historically only provided tactical combat forces for base defense.

Today, as in Vietnam, the Army is in charge of external base defense at nearly every US-led air base in Iraq. USAF wing commanders have little influence of the off-base terrain. Trained police forces (i.e., USAF security forces) have been restricted to internal base duties by order of CENTAF and relegated, with a few temporary exceptions, to internal access control throughout air installations.⁵⁶ The Army's off-base operations have been frustrated by the constant threat of ambush and improvised explosive devices (IED), its inability to disrupt the recruitment of insurgents, and the seemingly impossibility of directly targeting the insurgents with conventional firepower.⁵⁷ The situation is exasperated by the insurgent's penchant for hit-and-run tactics and their ability to hide among the population because the Army's conventional mindset minimizes interactions with the population and neglects the performance of

⁵⁴ In Vietnam, battalion-sized attacks accounted for 4 of the 472 air base attacks. Though rare, these attacks were a disaster for the VC as the firepower of USAF force, Army response units, and USAF gunships decimated the enemy with relatively light damage to the base. However, the intensity of the attacks were a disaster for the US in the information realm.

⁵⁵ Tactical Combat Force (TCF) is the term used in Joint Pub 3-10, *Rear Area Operations*.

⁵⁶ Of note, hundreds of security forces personnel are assigned under Army units for detainee operations and convoy security but these missions are not associated with base defense.

⁵⁷ It should be noted that the US Army's mentality is, understandably so, to maneuver and destroy conventional enemy forces and an insurgency does not provide these opportunities. The Army, and USAF's for that matter, conventional view of air base defense is to wait to engage the enemy decisively. If the enemy does not present himself in such a manner, than the hope is for the enemy to be incompetent.

constabulatory duties that help create a semblance of public order and security. Instead, the Army has pushed much of the population to the side of the insurgent (even some who do not prefer the insurgents) because of a strategy that seems to entail risk avoidance in order to keep casualties to a minimum.⁵⁸ This is most evident with the heavy dose of vehicle patrols (as opposed to foot) and limited restraint when it comes to the application of firepower. This strategy may help save some US lives in the short run but will not defeat an insurgency and will probably result in more US and Iraqi casualties in the long run.

As such, the Army has not interacted with the public (the typical ‘presence’ patrol in the Balad air base area entailed a four-vehicle armored convoy moving at 25-50 miles per hour through the area) and thus operates with little if any situational awareness. Understandably, soldiers without situational awareness or familiarity with the public become prone to periods of overreaction and will have a higher tendency to the indiscriminate use of firepower. This lack of situational awareness accounts for the reports of harassment of the Iraqi public to include the torching of an Iraqi’s orchards even when there was little evidence that the suspect was actually an insurgent.⁵⁹ This experience exemplifies the perils of putting counterforce operations first against an insurgent enemy.

In reality, the Army’s execution of joint doctrine in the Iraqi insurgent environment makes it impossible for air base security to be achieved for four reasons: 1) the enemy is nearly undetectable until they attack, 2) the enemy is among the population, 3) conventional forces cannot gain the initiative because intelligence is lacking, and 4) the conventional dictum of decisive force “against an enemy’s center of gravity” is not

⁵⁸ Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

realistic because the insurgent's center of gravity is the local population.⁶⁰ This relates to Clausewitz's "Trinity": military, government, and the people.

Clausewitz believed the opponent's military to be the center of gravity and, therefore, had to be attacked first in order to get the government and, later, the population to submit.⁶¹ In a counter-insurgency, one must control the will of the people first (e.g., center of gravity) before counterforce operations can commence.⁶² Without the will of the people, counterforce operations will most likely achieve insignificant results.

B. AIR FORCE DOCTRINE

Second, Air Force doctrine is also insufficient but in a completely different way. The Air Force seems to acknowledge the predominance of the asymmetric threat to air bases but chooses to counter the threat, strangely, with internal security. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.1., *Force Protection*, identifies standoff attacks, which constituted over 96% of air base attacks in Vietnam and a favored tactic of the insurgent, as the most serious threat to air bases.⁶³ Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*, says "asymmetric threats" using "unconventional warfare tactics" are the primary threat to "vital resources". And as if still providing the same response to General Westmoreland's letter, Air Force doctrine counters the "asymmetric threat" with internal security measures.

AFI 31-101, which may have correctly identified the threat above, proposes that the counter to the threat is circulation control, identification credentials, and point defense around critical resources. Apparently, the asymmetric threat in AFI 31-101 is the cold war saboteur, not an insurgent. This is not to say the security measures in AFI 31-101 are useless, they are not. Implementing sound security measures is never a bad idea and quite essential against suicide bombers and saboteurs but these internal actions will not prevent insurgents from successfully attacking an air base. As a result, USAF air base

⁶⁰ Stephen P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, "Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004) 15.

⁶¹ Karl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (translation by J.J. Graham). (London: Penguin Books, 1968) 121-123.

⁶² Basilici and Simmons, 23.

⁶³ Briar, "Assessing Air Base Defense"

defense doctrine is tied to standards and not to the local situation. Therefore, security at Offutt AFB in Nebraska is essentially the same as the security at Balad Air Base in Iraq.⁶⁴ At Balad, Air Force security forces are used almost exclusively to guard access to the flightline just as they do at every CONUS base even though Balad is attacked almost daily with standoff attacks.⁶⁵ This internally-focused security approach neglects intelligence in favor of standardization.

The Air Force's other doctrinal problem is the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Air Force Policy Directive 31-3 defines the TAOR as an area that extends from the base perimeter that the defense force commander can *control* with effective fire.⁶⁶ Considering that air base defense units are normally armed with the M2 .50 caliber machine gun, the TAOR would theoretically extend approximately 1500 meters outside the base perimeter. Within the TAOR, the Air Force expects security forces to patrol the area and/or coordinate for joint forces, allied units, or host nation units to patrol the area. Beyond the TAOR, the Air Force completely depends on joint forces, allied units, or host nation units to control. Obviously, this line of reasoning has many deficiencies. First, the concept of an "air base TAOR" is not included in joint publications. Second, does the ability to fire on an area equate to control? If Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and El Salvador are any indication, the answer is a resounding no. The Air Force assumes, by defining the TAOR by the capability of weapons that reside on base, that the base can be defended from the base itself – continuing the primacy within the Air Force of the concept of internal defense (since the 1950's). Air Force doctrine also does not identify a way of coordinating for the defense of the TAOR and beyond with any other agency.

⁶⁴ Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. Roger Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, saw the same problem in Vietnam. Fox noted security at Vietnam air bases was based essentially on the security standards for bases with nuclear laden aircraft in the CONUS. These standards were used by HQ 7th Air Force (7AF) to inspect and standardize security across Vietnam.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Briar, "Assessing Air Base Defense"

The Air Force doctrine assumes some other agency will assist in security of the area beyond the TAOR, provides no guidance if no other force exists beyond the TAOR or if an existing force is incapable of handling the threat. Yet to defend the base from the base, the Air Force believes it will be able to identify the “asymmetric threat” in time to protect the base and its resources. In this way, the Air Force views the “asymmetric threat” as a conventional ground assault, which can be identified and attrited before resources have been destroyed. As has been discussed early, assuming an insurgent will act like a conventional force has been unsuccessful for the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan against an “asymmetric threat”.

What is noticeable is what has been left out of air base defense doctrine - law enforcement. The view of societal control in a military sense is very similar to the way a cop views the neighborhood where they walk the beat. Essentially, it is knowing everything that happens in the community (at least in a general sense) and being able to affect any outcome. This puts a premium on observation, communication, and the gathering of information – which are the cornerstones of effective law enforcement *and* in subverting an “asymmetric threat”. In fact, the concepts of community policing, which seeks to reduce the fear of crime in a community through knowledge, interaction, and civic action, and intelligence-led policing, which uses investigation and observation to find, fix, and finish serious criminal threats to a community, seem suited to a counterinsurgent role.⁶⁷ Yet even though the Air Force security forces are trained police personnel, the Air Force does not view those skills as useful in the base defense role. Instead, as Major David Briar observed, Air Force base defense “boils down to putting

⁶⁷ Gary Potter (Professor of Criminal Justice at Eastern Kentucky University), email message to author, 22 Jul 2004. Controlled experiments indicate that community policing is effective in reducing the fear of crime but not necessarily crime itself; although, the dramatic reduction in the crime rate of New York City has been partially attributed to a community policing approach. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is a policing approach that first seeks to understand the environment through a relentless drive to gather information and intelligence on the community. ILP has been effective at reducing the operations of criminal enterprises and trafficking organizations. Intelligence-led policing was developed in the United Kingdom as a way of policing Northern Ireland. ILP and community policing both depend on information management, two-way communications with the public, scientific data analysis, and problem-solving by individual police officers or small units. Author Robert Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts*, made a similar comment that the future of US operations will have as much in common with community policing as it does with combat. Kaplan made this comment during an afternoon question and answer session at the Naval Postgraduate School on September 15, 2005.

bodies, weapons, sensors, and fires in the right place at the right time".⁶⁸ If true, this is THE conventional approach to base defense that is confounded by the "unconventional warfare tactics" of the insurgent. This approach presents base defense as a technical or engineering problem instead of the human problem of controlling information and behavior and acquiring intelligence. The goal of this engineering problem is to finish the insurgent through counterforce actions but it misses the critical step of finding and fixing the insurgent first (a human problem).⁶⁹

C. TECHNOLOGY

Contributing to the Air Force's inability in battling an insurgent enemy, is the employment of technology. *This is the third key problem in air base defense doctrine.* Technology has always served the Air Force as a force multiplier in the aerial realm of combat. The Air Force has greatly benefited from an enhanced ability to detect and neutralize enemy aircraft at long-range (e.g., air-to-air missiles). This philosophy of long-distance detection and neutralization has become ingrained in the doctrine of air base defense as well. The Air Force has purchased well over \$300 million in mobile sensor systems since 1995 to enhance air base defense. The detection systems often include infrared sensors, ground radars, infrared cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), counter-battery radar, and remote firing platforms. The standard configuration is for these sensors to be positioned on-base looking out in order to detect an advancing enemy force. Early detection allows the US defenders to seize the initiative quickly if the enemy attacks. Of course, employing technology in this manner is based on two key assumptions about the enemy and the terrain:

1. The enemy force will attack in a way that allows their intent to be perceived by their actions. Specifically, the enemy will execute a direct action

⁶⁸ Briar, "Assessing Air Base Defense"

⁶⁹ Benjamin J. Hettingja, "The Defense of Tan Son Nhut, 31 January 1968: A Study in the Nature of Air Base Security." (master's thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2002). Hettingja presents base defense as human problem and compares this to the Air Force's misguided attempts of seeking only technical solutions to fix air base defense. However, Hettingja essentially defines the "human problem" as that of leadership ensuring the right troop is in the right spot at the right time. Assuredly, this perspective is a vital lesson for combat leadership but in the overall perspective of air base defense, the insurgent is still provided free reign to operate, maneuver, and grow.

mission or short-range stand-off attack against the base in order to destroy critical resources. This is a conventional force-on-force assumption.⁷⁰

2. There is a clear zone around the air base devoid of natural landscape and urban terrain which would disrupt the capabilities of the sensors. Further, very little population can reside in the sensor zones because large congregations will make it nearly impossible to discern threatening movements that could be detected by the sensors. A UAV cannot distinguish between a lawful citizen with an AK-47 and an insurgent with an AK-47. Also, hampering this assumption is that many of the world's air bases are built either in urban areas or on the periphery of urban areas.⁷¹

Both these assumptions point to a conventional perspective that assumes the enemy is willing to execute a “force-on-force” attack and that the population will be a negligible factor. In this false belief, the sensors have created a deficit in air base defense strategy by serving to keep the air base’s defenders planted on-base in a response mode focused on finishing an enemy force instead of finding and fixing that enemy force. Of course, if the enemy attacks in accordance with the Air Force’s conventional assumptions, then the Air Force will most likely finish them. Which is precisely why the insurgents do not attack that way.⁷²

This is not to say that the sensor systems and UAV’s should not be used. They should be and have proven effective in assisting air base defenders but are far from a “cure-all”.⁷³ The concept of response forces tied to sensors is certainly a smart idea but will never disrupt an insurgency or seize the initiative from an insurgent force. Response

⁷⁰ This is very similar to the VC sapper attacks in Vietnam. However, sapper attacks accounted for less than 4% of all air base attacks in Vietnam and less than 1% of the air base attacks in Iraq.

⁷¹ Walter Banning, “Military Base Encroachment: BRAC and JLUS,” (n.d.). Retrieved on 6 Sep 2005 from <http://www.dca.state.fl.us/fdcp/dcp/militarybase/index.cfm>. US air bases continually face the problem of urban encroachment because air bases often are the top or one of the top employers in the region where they are located. This attracts a population to thrive on that economic opportunity. Also, many of the world’s most capable air bases are also airports which are normally built near a population center the airport was built to serve.

⁷² The Air Force perceives expanding sensor systems and reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines will give the Air Force the ability to detect an attack and counter before the insurgent can act. This is a false belief in technology’s ability to consistently provide early detection of attack and has never been the case especially when one considers that an air base defense area may cover as much or more than 200 square kilometers.

⁷³ Francis Vangel, “Gunfire Detection System Brings the Enemy Out of the Shadows,” *Special Warfare*, (July 2005) 28-29. Gunfire Detection Systems have shown to be of considerable value especially when confronted by single snipers. US Army Special Operations Command claims that the system allows quick reaction forces to find “its target” approximately 40% of the time.

forces are inherently reactive in nature. Although response forces won't defeat an insurgency, if deliberately and timely executed, they can force an insurgency to absorb great punishment and possibly influence the insurgents to reconsider targeting the air base. Of course, the centralized command and control structure of most air base defense operations results in a slow and ineffective response force. However, if a strategy of command and 'decontrol' is employed, air base response forces could have a much greater effect. Command and decontrol means the sensor-and-shooter are linked more than just informational but the shooter makes the decisions on how the team will react to the information. This puts emphasis on small-unit leadership, parallel communication and allows quicker, more fluid counter-strikes against an insurgent. Unfortunately, the Air Force has almost unanimously established the main base defense operations center as the annunciating point for the base defense sensor systems and communications.⁷⁴ This keeps situational awareness with base defense leadership instead of the maneuver forces.

Even the most effective use of technology and command will never amount to an effective base defense unless it is linked with a strategy that separates the insurgent from the population and seizes the initiative. The use of technology and response forces at Balad air base, the most attacked air base in Iraq, provides a feasible example.

In early 2004, Balad initiated a program to counter the insurgents stand-off attacks. The plan entailed the extensive use of UAV's, helicopters, counter-battery radar, and response forces to attack enemy forces once they initiated stand-off attacks. Quick reaction forces were positioned on-base (often helicopter transported) and off-base in vehicles. The results were more than disappointing – attacks against Balad increased dramatically.⁷⁵ Although, no one factor was ever identified as integral in the failure of

⁷⁴ Annunciating point is the location where the sensor system alerts an alarm monitor to the possible intrusion.

⁷⁵ Brad Scott (USAF Intelligence Senior Master Sergeant), communication with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. The exact numbers of attacks were unavailable to the author but Sergeant Scott said the weather and a reaction to Fallujah may also have contributed to the dramatic increase in attacks. As far as the weather, the insurgents were more active in 2003 and 2005 during the summer months than during the winter months and 2004 was no different. Yet these comments also speak to the fact that the conventional operation to disrupt the air base attacks at Balad was ineffective since it did interdict the summer activity of the insurgents or the disrupt the violent response to Fallujah.

the defense, it can be assumed that when an enemy is hidden among the population, it is almost impossible for a sensor to distinguish between a citizen and an insurgent. Secondly, the sensors cannot be everywhere, all the time and in fact very few insurgent attacks were ever detected before a rocket or mortar was already in-flight.⁷⁶ Third, insurgents disguised as Iraqi police, Iraqi Army, or normal civilians were nearly undetectable to sensors. The insurgents even figured ways to outmaneuver counter-battery radar, heliborne forces, and UAV's by launching stand-off attacks via remote systems or timers, just as the VC/NVA had in Vietnam.⁷⁷ However, based on the location of the IEDs, ambushes, and stand-off attacks in Iraq, it is believed the local population has been aware of over 90% of the insurgent attacks before the attacks were executed.⁷⁸ If this is true, then it would appear the key to base defense is winning the war for intelligence and situational awareness and that, apparently, can only be achieved by a focus on interacting with the population. Technology cannot do that – only defense forces in the communities can. And, in fact, it wasn't until a population-focused air base defense operation -- Task Force 1041 -- was implemented with the smart use of technology that air base attacks against Balad began to decrease.

D. COMMAND AND CONTROL

The fourth key problem with Air Force air base defense doctrine is the structuring of the command and control. The Air Force's centralized organization for base defense is a problem in itself. The problem results from a strange mix of "too little" command from key USAF decision-makers and the over-control of maneuver forces. This situation is created because the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC), AFOSI operations, and the Air Operations Center (AOC) are often geographically separated from each other.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

⁷⁷ Ibid; Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 125-137.

⁷⁸ Ford, "Speak No Evil", retrieved on 12 Aug 2005 from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05summer/ford.htm>. Ford believes that it is not unreasonable to believe that every attack against coalition forces has been in the presence of some noncombatants.

⁷⁹ The AOC at the base-level is also commonly referred to as the Wing Operations Center (WOC).

BDOC's, with a myriad of sensor systems and static posts, normally has good situational awareness of the ground situation on-base but is often ignorant of the air operations situation (i.e., sorties, fuel, supply, maintenance, etc.). The AOC, on the other hand, has a near-complete picture of the air operations situation but remains ignorant of the ground situation on-base. Without off-base operations and limited access to AFOSI information beyond periodic threat briefs, both the BDOC and AOC are ignorant of the ground situation off-base. The disconnected situation has three negative effects on air base operations:

1. The base or wing commander, as the ultimate decision-maker, does not take part in base defense planning, coordination, and execution. This is partially due to the fact that nearly all wing commanders are pilots with little knowledge of base defense and partially because the wing commander's AOC is not involved in base defense. The lack of top leadership focus sends a message to allies and indigenous forces that base defense is not a priority to the US.
2. Any information that is unknown is considered "okay". When this assumption is broken by the course of events (i.e., a plane is on final during a firefight that the AOC was unaware of), then the command centers respond with surprise and crisis decision-making that may be counterproductive and unnecessary.
3. To avoid surprises, the AOC often institutes more centralized command procedures due to a lack of trust in air base defense leadership. The result is a slow-down in the decision-making cycle of air base defense. Dynamic proactive (raids, ambushes, patrolling, etc.) and reactive (deployment of quick response forces, counter-battery fire, etc.) base defense actions become ineffective in responding to tactics of the insurgent.

Strangely, this type of command is unique to deployed air base defense. If security forces are at home station in a law enforcement mode, they operate through a command and decentralized execution (or even decontrol). For example, a request for police response will terminate at the security control center (normally manned by an E-4 or E-5) and once the information is received and forces are dispatched, the senior ranking responder assumes incident command. The incident commander directs response forces, takes responsibility for the communications net, and manages the situation until completion. The incident commanders are expected to take control and handle the situation at the lowest possible level and, unless the situation dictates, are not to occupy time seeking approval for actions from senior leaders. Yet these same personnel will be

proactive and dynamic under a decentralized control structure and reactive and passive under a centralized air base defense control structure. So how does Air Force security forces solve problem? The answer is counterintuitive – centralize and combine.

Combining the AOC with the BDOC and AFOSI command centers as a point of doctrine allows the wing commander to achieve a level of situational awareness to comfortably, or uncomfortably if that is necessary, delegate responsibility to subordinates to take command of incidents.⁸⁰ The fact is that unless the wing commander delegates much of his air base defense command and control down to the flight or squad-level than the air base defense forces will not be able to perceive and act quicker than the insurgents.⁸¹

A combined AOC-BDOC-AFOSI organization combines sensor-to-shooter communications with the decision-maker and allows subordinate leaders to act within the wing commander's intent without needing to seek additional guidance. Further, the wing commander will better understand and accept the responsibility of base defense. Without this understanding, the Air Force could not effectively combat an insurgent foe because coordinating with, training, and advising allied and indigenous forces as well as the execution of civic action projects could not be accomplished without the active participation of the primary local US decision-maker – the wing commander.

E. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

The fifth key problem with Air Force air base defense doctrine is the organization of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI). AFOSI has a few basic missions when it comes to air base defense: counter-intelligence (CI), establishing overt intelligence networks, and providing threat briefings. The thrust of CI is identifying organizations or agencies that are gathering intelligence on US missions. In this manner,

⁸⁰ This comment is based on observations made by Professor Kalev Sepp of the Naval Postgraduate School. In the summer of 2005, Professor Sepp was tasked to travel throughout Iraq to document best practices in the counterinsurgency. On September 14, 2005, Professor Sepp briefed on the need to decentralize in order to fight an insurgency. He relayed a quote from a particularly effective battalion commander who commented on decentralizing C2, “we decentralized until I was uncomfortable and then I knew we were there.”

⁸¹ The “perceive-act” relationship is analogous to John Boyd’s OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act).

AFOSI works to uncover criminal organizations, foreign intelligence services, and internal agents. AFOSI has a solid history of uncovering insiders/spies within the Air Force as well as organized criminal activities normally constituting service members stealing government property.⁸² AFOSI combines this information and presents analysis as threat briefs to the local base commander. And although helpful to provide local commanders situational awareness, much of the thrust of the CI program and threat briefs is reactionary in nature and does little to expose an insurgent organization.⁸³ As such, AFOSI has been often criticized for being of little utility against insurgents and terrorists; however, AFOSI is capable of making a much greater impact in base defense.

After 9/11, AFOSI's primary mission became force protection. AFOSI's agents focused their attention on discovering threats to air base. To do this, AFOSI is chartered as an overt intelligence gathering force (primarily human intelligence, HUMINT). The term overt in this sense means that AFOSI agents cannot use aliases.⁸⁴ Although the inability to operate covertly may hinder them somewhat, AFOSI agents can interrogate suspects, pay informants, turn double-agents, establish "dead-drops", and implement surveillance detection operations.⁸⁵ The problem is that as an overt presence that normally constitutes one or two agents, AFOSI needs a permissive environment to be effective. Saigon and Da Nang and Baghdad (March to June, 2003) provide a historical pattern that proves with a permissive environment that allows freedom of action and maneuver, AFOSI could be a predictive and proactive force.⁸⁶ The intelligence AFOSI gathered allowed the execution of precise, discriminate force in order to disrupt insurgent

⁸² Phillip Forbes (Air Force Office of Special Investigation Special Agent), communication with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. SA Forbes related that AFOSI's CI training still focuses CI as if the purpose was finding a Cold War spy and not CI on the tactical battlefield.

⁸³ Interview with field grade US military Human Intelligence (HUMINT) officer. The source had worked with AFOSI throughout his career to include most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.

⁸⁴ Interview with field grade US military Human Intelligence (HUMINT) officer. The source had worked with AFOSI throughout his career to include most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

operations. However, without a permissive or secure environment, AFOSI has more often than not been ineffective.⁸⁷

In the USAF, AFOSI has a chain of command that separates AFOSI from the other Air Force organization with the exact same mission of force protection, the security forces.⁸⁸ And it is the security forces that must create and maintain a secure environment around the air base to allow AFOSI to perform their force protection mission without disruption. Yet the security forces cannot maintain a secure environment without the effective execution of AFOSI's overt intelligence gathering operations. This reciprocal dependency would be best served by putting both organizations under a single commander, just as the Special Police and Military Forces were placed under a single commander during the successful counterinsurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, and the Philippines. Both AFOSI and security forces require the efforts of the other to be successful yet they have no responsibility to each other. This doctrinal and organizational oversight must be corrected or air base defense will continue to suffer.

F. SUMMARY

The joint and USAF doctrine for base defense as well as the USAF's use of technology in air base defense appear to have been created to combat the unconventional threat yet none provide an effective framework to counter the insurgent other than killing them when they attack.⁸⁹

The doctrine views counterforce operations and internal control measures as the key to air base defense. This doctrine fails because the insurgent will not use tactics that allow counterforce operations to be effective. Not only do these strategies and the USAF use of technology cede the initiative and intelligence to the insurgent but also the strategies appear to accept air base attacks as inevitable and, therefore, let the insurgent win the "information war" that is critical to achieving local security.

⁸⁷ Ibid; SA Forbes made the same comment during his May 2005 interview with the author.

⁸⁸ AFOSI agents technically do not work for the wing commander but for regional AFOSI detachments.

⁸⁹ Of course, this has been extremely difficult for the Air Force as well because of a command structure that de-emphasizes senior base leaders and a base defense organization that over-controls maneuver units.

Organizational culture and constraints also hamper air base defense, especially within the Air Force. The separation of the AOC and BDOC makes for a dangerous mix of delayed operations and uninformed decisions. The separation of the command channels between AFOSI and security forces ensures that neither agency will be able to maximize their capabilities. Further, the separated command structures create inefficiencies in the overt collection operations of both the security forces and AFOSI.

Since the conventional approach of joint doctrine and the Army and the internal strategies of the USAF cannot defeat the insurgents and defend the air base, the U.S. military must look to other approaches that may. A solution may be found by first discovering the vulnerabilities of an insurgency that are exploitable by a base defense force.

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IV. INSURGENCY, TERRORISM, AND THE SYSTEM OF INSURGENCY

The history of air base attacks was well documented in Alan Vick's 1996 RAND study, *Snakes in the Eagle's Nest*, as part of Project AIR FORCE. Vick's data (along with that from Iraq) documents that from 1941-present there had been over 2,000 air base attacks which have damaged or destroyed over 2,000 aircraft.⁹⁰ Surprisingly, lost on Vick in his analysis is the significance of the insurgent threat to air bases. Since WWII insurgents have executed every successful ground attack that has damaged or destroyed US aircraft or that has wounded or killed US personnel.⁹¹ The conclusion is simple, *the threat to air bases in the modern era is the insurgent and terrorist, not conventional forces.*⁹² And the difference is essential – conventional forces seek victorious engagements while the insurgent seeks victory in the political battlespace.

Often insurgency and terrorism are viewed under the auspices of violence alone. This is a short-sighted interpretation of the long-term goals of the insurgent. Terrorist expert Martha Crenshaw has noted that terrorism as political violence is basically motivated in two ways: instrumental objectives and organizational needs.⁹³ Instrumental objectives are the political objectives, the desired end-state, of the insurgent/terrorist organization whether that be the establishment of a Sunni-led theocracy (a possible motivation in Iraq) or a communist government that was the objective of the VC/NVA network in Vietnam. For success, Crenshaw notes, the environment must be conducive to the instrumental objectives of the insurgent/terrorist group or the group will fail in

⁹⁰ Vick, *Snakes*, 114-158; Holmes, "Security Forces Transformation" brief.

⁹¹ Vick, 114-158; however, Vick's data does not include events such as attacks at Khobar Towers in 1996, an air base attack in South America in 1997 (which may have been friendly fire), Afghanistan, and Iraq. All of these attacks were executed by insurgents/terrorists as well.

⁹² In fact, Martin Van Creveld (1997) in his contribution called "Technology and War II: Postmodern War?" in *Modern War*, demonstrated that without regard to World War I and II and the Korean War, nearly every conflict of the 20th Century has been "unconventional". Creveld also asserts that modern powers fight these wars poorly.

⁹³ Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, edited by David C. Rappaport (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) 18-22.

attaining significant support and become easy prey for the government it opposes.⁹⁴ This view is based on the belief that the objectives of the insurgent group must somehow link with the social structure and social mores of the contested environment, i.e., the population. No doubt this would be helpful and probably necessary in the long-run; however, not essential in the first phase of an insurgency.

A. PHASES OF AN INSURGENT SYSTEM

Although very few insurgencies actually grow through well-defined, distinct phases, the concept of Phases provides a good illustration of the life cycle of an insurgent system. Insurgency acts as a system at the local level that a political entity (or group of entities) employs to grow in order to eventually become big enough to challenge and take over the state/government or at least strong enough to dismantle it. This is necessary because insurgencies inevitably start out smaller and weaker than the state so it must remain invisible to the state in order grow.⁹⁵

The insurgent system is a plan of organizational growth based on how the insurgents “interact” with the population. The interaction is based on manipulation of information to exert control over the population. The manipulation of information is possible because the insurgents strive to either isolate the population from other sources of information or to demonstrate to the population that the insurgent’s information is more important. The manipulation is achieved through acts of symbolic violence, intimidation or replacement of local leaders, public statements, and attacking the force that opposes them (i.e., police, army, outside agencies, etc.). The goal is that the population will process this information and, as a result, behave in a manner that is advantageous to the insurgent. Whether that behavior is as an active fighter, silently

⁹⁴ Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Political Terrorism,” *Political Psychology: Contemporary Problems and Issues*, edited by Margaret Hermann (New York: Jossey-Bass, 1986) 380-381.; Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). Johnson makes the same assertion as Crenshaw, that the objectives of a revolution must link with the environment it hopes to take over or it will fail. Both Crenshaw’s and Johnson’s view that a successful insurgency needs a receptive environment is also an essential part of Mao Zedong’s theory of revolutions.

⁹⁵ The term “state” refers to political authority that is combating an insurgency, normally the government of a sovereign country. The fact is that most often the US military assists other nations in their fight against an insurgency or the US is the acting state (e.g., CPA) or the US is operating in a country that has a insurgent/terrorist threat but the US is not actively combating the insurgent even though the insurgent could be targeting US forces.

neutral, or as a supplier of resources, as long as it is the behavior the insurgents require and expect, than the population will ensure its own safety.⁹⁶

The insurgents will maintain this system of growth until the state or government takes action to disrupt the system and the insurgent's ability to gain strength from the people (recruiting, security, and support). The state must separate the insurgent from the population politically.⁹⁷ This prevents the continued transmission of the insurgent's narrative, the extraction of insurgent resources (recruitment, logistics, information, and legitimacy), and prevents the insurgent's ability to dictate the public's preferences through fear and intimidation. The result is a belief that the state will be the winner in the struggle.




Figure 1. Open Systems Model of Insurgency.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Most of the population in an insurgency remains generally neutral while possibly having sympathies for the side that appears to be winning or with the side that is most representative of the population's social identity.

⁹⁷ Models for battling an insurgent and creating a secure environment will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁹⁸ Professor Erik Jansen teaches Organizational Design for Special Operations with the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

The model shows how an insurgency grows through message (instrumental objectives), action (transformation process), culture (attractiveness), outputs of action (reputation), and, finally, with positive results towards achieving the instrumental objectives (outcome). These combine to generate the resources needed for growth: recruiting, security, legitimacy, and support. Breaking this system requires the state to separate the insurgent from the population physically, politically, and informationally.

Andrew Krepinevich describes insurgency as a protracted, three-phased systemic struggle, with the objective of overthrowing the existing political order or to achieve some political concession.⁹⁹ This paper will use Krepinevich's theory as an outline for our analysis of an insurgency.

1. Phase I

Phase I is the founding of a political movement built around a core organization. During Phase I, core members proselytize the instrumental goals of the insurgent organization to the population they wish to control. This is with a focus on a local approach to establishing political control and a base of operations.¹⁰⁰ Establishing a modicum of local political control is made possible, initially, because in Phase I there is some freedom of action and political power that the government will not contest and provide a starting point for an insurgency.¹⁰¹ The expansion from the initial base will

⁹⁹ Dr. Krepinevich is Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning for the 21st century. Dr. Krepinevich's theory of insurgency in regard to this paper was taken from his testimony before the US House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services on March 17, 2005. Much of Krepinevich's theory is based on Mao Tse Tung's writings on revolutionary warfare.

¹⁰⁰ This is akin to Tip O'Neil's great political observation, "all politics are local". The politics in an insurgency are also local because each locality has a different political outlook and the insurgency must adjust their strategy with each locality. An example (although at a more regional level) is if the US faced an insurgency, the insurgents would have to approach Texas (conservative political slant with loose gun control laws) and California (liberal political slant with strict gun control laws) with different strategies.

¹⁰¹ There is normally a level in a society where a state cannot (or will not) penetrate or influence. An example is that small-time drug dealers in certain neighborhoods operate with near impunity because the local government either is unaware of the severity of the problem or does not see the problem as being worth the resources needed to combat the problem. This is political operating space the state has chosen not to control. However, if turf wars between dealers or gangs erupt in the killings of numerous people, than the state will often crackdown in order to take control of the problems. A common response is for drug dealers to either slow-down their operation or relocate because they cannot directly challenge the state.

require at some point for the insurgent to engage in a zero-sum contest for control with the state where political power gained by the insurgent is lost by the state – and vice versa.¹⁰² The Phase I proselytizing needed for the insurgency to grow is not normally done from the pulpit, but through Propaganda by the deed.

Efforts to expand the core organization are anchored in acts of terrorism such as murder, sabotage, and local intimidation. The importance of the insurgent action is paramount – the insurgent organization commits acts of terror to advertise their idea, strength, and commitment. But the insurgents are in a precarious position. They must commit these acts of terror while simultaneously staying “invisible” to the state because in Phase I, until they can implement a large mobilization, the insurgents are infinitely weaker than the state. Remaining active and invisible is why insurgents and terrorists do not seek decisive military engagements, but instead usually avoid them.

Stand-off attacks (mortar, rockets, etc.), car bombs, hijackings, kidnappings, and sniping are the hallmarks of insurgent and terrorist operations. The tactics allow the insurgent to appear stronger while also preventing the state from initiating a devastating counterattack. If an insurgency is discovered and pursued by the state before it is prepared to survive and dictate public preferences, than it will most likely be crushed. However, in the initial phases, the insurgency is small and can remain invisible to the state. The size and power of the state makes it visible and vulnerable to insurgent/terrorist attacks. The survival of the insurgent system is dually dependent on its ability to remain active yet invisible and the government’s inability to find and fix the insurgent.¹⁰³ The air base, in this regard, is the perfect symbol of the state (and the US

¹⁰² Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare,” (notes from presentation, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004). Dr. McCormick is the Head of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School at the time of this writing. Basilici and Simmons, “Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare,” 31. A superb graph of the “insurgent growth curve” is presented.

¹⁰³ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970) 28-45. This statement assumes that an insurgency is not receiving external support. On p. 38, Leites and Wolf state that a strong enough external supporter could maintain an insurgency even without the local population’s support but this would be difficult. Nevertheless, isolating the environment of the insurgency is a requirement at all levels: local, regional, national.

for that matter) and is why the insurgents chose to attack. Air bases are *large, loud, and static*.

Due to this asymmetry in power, Phase I of an insurgency is about security and growth and air bases are a lucrative and strategic target because air bases present a low-threat opportunity to attack a US center of gravity and advertise the strength of insurgent/terrorist cause (and the weakness of the US' cause). The message these air base attacks communicate to the contested populations is powerful: *we can challenge the US in its own stronghold while we remain unchallenged by the US in our stronghold.*¹⁰⁴

It must be said that some insurgencies that seek a political concession from the government (instead of political replacement) or that cannot generate mobilization among the population may remain in Phase I stage of an insurgency intentionally (or by necessity). An example of this strategy is animal rights' organization that uses violence to protest violence towards animals and seeks government assistance in stopping the cruelty. However, these strategies normally fail because groups that remain in Phase I must remain underground. In the underground, the insurgent organization exists without reference to the real world and often falls into a destructive cycle. Unless corrected with new external stimuli, the organization becomes corrupted by internal dialogue and usually falls into defeat.¹⁰⁵

2. Phase II

In Phase II of an insurgency, according to Krepinevich, insurgents seek to expand their base of support. Attacks now more often target government symbols, whether that is facilities, government officials, convoys, etc. These attacks normally employ hit-and-run tactics such as large-scale bombings and ambushes but even in Phase II, the insurgents still employ the tactics of terrorism exemplified in Phase I. The insurgent attacks also serve to establish geographic areas as physical sanctuaries where insurgents

¹⁰⁴ There are two contested populations. The first is the local community around the air base which is deciding whether to place its support behind the state or the insurgent. The second is the US and world public which provide the political support for external involvement in the conflict.

¹⁰⁵ John Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," (computer printout of slide from Pentagon briefing, 1976), slide 109. This is a briefing Boyd first provided in 1976 at the Pentagon and delivered many other times until his death in 1997.

exert overt control over the population. In this way the insurgent protects the link with the population who support the insurgency with security, membership, and legitimacy. These insurgent controlled areas are either normally remote (out the government's reach) or urban (difficult for the government to operate). However, these insurgent sanctuaries are more than just physical; they are mental and moral as well.

Mental sanctuaries exist in the fact that the insurgent is viewed as the most powerful political entity in a given area. Through this perception, the insurgent is seen by the population as the eventual winner in the struggle against the state and, therefore, has the power to introduce biased information, ambiguous information, restrict contradictory information, and intimidate the public in order to impede the population's decision-making. The result is a continuous process of adjusting the preferences of the population in order that strengthen the insurgent's control over the population. *Without adjusting the preferences of the contested population, the insurgent will never achieve mass mobilization.*

As the control of the population is tightened, the moral sanctuary becomes the insurgent's terrain as well. This is how the insurgent sees "himself" and how the insurgent wants to be viewed by the public. The insurgent is the "freedom fighter" while the government is the "oppressor"; the insurgent uses "discriminate force" and the government uses "indiscriminate force"; the insurgent stays true to its preached "values" while the government is a hypocritical organization. This moral sanctuary is as important to the internal stability of the insurgent organization as a means of organizational identity, than it is in influencing the population. Different from the mental environment where the insurgent's instrumental objectives mainly target the state and the contested population, the moral environment is represented by the insurgency's organizational culture. The goal of the organizational culture is maintaining the internal structure of the insurgent organization.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Crenshaw, "Inside Terrorist Organizations," 18-24. Crenshaw is saying that if the only motivation for terrorist actions was political objectives than assuredly terrorists would be amenable to negotiation, amnesty, but the fact is that they usually are not so there must be other factors in their motivations. These are organizational needs.

Just as any business organization must commit resources to maintain the organizational culture and benefits, insurgent organizations must do the same. Insurgent organizations live in a clandestine environment where often the sacrifice of family, wealth, and life itself is often demanded. The insurgent organization provides an *identity* return for the service of an active member.¹⁰⁷ Without this identity of moral superiority, the insurgent organization could suffer splinters and defections that would jeopardize the existence of the insurgent organization.

This moral aspect of war may be the most important in an insurgency because it represents the unifying principles of the combatant. It is what defines the insurgent, sustains them, and constrains them. The moral aspect of war is the fighting spirit and will. The issue in this moral aspect of war is that what is moral to the US may be immoral to the insurgent (and even the contested population) but the vice versa could also be true. In the essence of this moral conflict, each side tries to force the other to either abandon their moral code or become hypocritical of their moral claims – not necessarily adopt new ones. Straying from the moral basis causes dissention as unity, discipline, and organization are frayed.

Insurgent leaders are principally guided by the instrumental, political objectives of the group but assuredly some of the organization's membership may not share the same aspect of political motivation – or at least not to the same level. It is their identity in the group that provides them status. Any model of terrorism must take into account the varieties and the interactive dynamics of the organizational processes that goes beyond the political attractiveness of a group's instrumental objectives.¹⁰⁸ This means that insurgent and terrorist actions are not always primarily political but instead may also be needed to affect organizational maintenance. These maintenance "actions" could be to spur morale, trust, financing, or simply to keep members active because the group's acts of violence are their identity in the organization. This *identity* is a tradition of physical violence (even glorification of violence) in order to help shape the group's identity that is at least partially tied to acts of violence. This violent identity helps shape active members

¹⁰⁷ Crenshaw, "Psychology of Political Terrorism," 391-393.

¹⁰⁸ Crenshaw, "Psychology of Political Terrorism," 381-382.

(and prospective recruits) in a way where those that join the organization must accept this culture of violence or they will be rejected or even, terminated. This propensity to use ‘violence in the name of a higher calling or moral idea’ as a unifying identity for underground conspiracies is described in Crenshaw’s essay, *Psychology of Political Terrorism*:

The problem is to find some commonality in a heterogeneous group of individuals, especially in considering cross-national terrorism. One facet of personality or one predisposition to which analysts have been drawn is the individual's attitudes toward and feelings about violence and aggression.¹⁰⁹

This revolutionary violence is most often not impulsive but the focus of the violence is often a purposeful exercise in instilling fear in a community through symbolic demonstrations of horror and personal sacrifice.¹¹⁰ The creation of fear not only serves instrumental objectives by serving to adjust the preferences of a target population through the organization’s perceived strength but begets an attractive (or intimidating) reputation among the population. This reputation gives status to members and begets legitimacy and security for the organization. The result reinforces a member’s identity as a self-sacrificing warrior.¹¹¹

Insurgents must not only make their political objectives attractive to the public but also to the organization itself so active membership can grow. From this perspective, violent acts are committed to either to support instrumental objectives (i.e., manipulate information – primarily, the relative strength of the insurgency as compared to the state), reinforce the moral culture (i.e., organizational culture), or both. The fact is that this is a truly rare occurrence where an insurgent attack is without a need make a political

¹⁰⁹ Crenshaw, “Psychology of Political Terrorism,” 398.

¹¹⁰ Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicidal Terrorism,” *Defeating Terrorism*, edited by Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill Co., 2003) 104. Hoffman suicide terrorism is extremely effective at instilling fear in a community (as he documented it did in Israel) and at relatively little cost.

¹¹¹ David Tucker, “International Terrorism,” (notes from presentation, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). Dr. Tucker teaches International Terrorism with the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

statement, kill or maim, instill fear, or reinforce the moral culture and organizational expectations.¹¹²

With the physical, mental, and moral sanctuaries in place, the insurgency can implement mass mobilization to challenge the government for ultimate control of the state. Yet just as in Phase I, many insurgents will recognize that they will never be able mobilize enough to seize power over the government but are able to achieve enough of a base to continue Phase II operations. The goal would be to achieve a major political concession from the government, expel an external supporter of the state, or, over the long-term, cause the collapse of the government itself.

3. Phase III

If the insurgents are able to achieve mass mobilization, then they can move to Phase III. In Phase III, the insurgents confront the government in main force actions, rather than the hit-and-run tactics of Phase II, with the intent of defeating the government in open warfare. The insurgents also continue actions consistent with Phase I and II in the hopes of generating enough momentum to convince the government of impending defeat and force the government to collapse. However, a Phase III collapse is different from a Phase II collapse. In a Phase II collapse, the insurgents still may have to contend with other political entities for control of the state even after the official government has disappeared. In a Phase III collapse, there is no question that the insurgency is the new government.

B. PREFERENCES – THE INSURGENT CENTER OF GRAVITY

The instrumental approach is based on the belief that individuals and groups behave according to their political preferences.¹¹³ Political preferences are based on the past and present interpretation of information by the group and/or individual. This information includes the nature of the social structure, social mores and norms (as in personal identity), expectations of prosperity, and expectations of victory.

¹¹² Crenshaw, “Psychology of Political Terrorism,” 386-388.

¹¹³ Leites and Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority*, 28-47.

Social structure and norms are analogous to local ‘attitude’ and are slow to change and resistant to contradictory information.¹¹⁴ These have been referred to as “pure preferences” because, theoretically, if all things were equal these preferences represent the political situation a group or individual would prefer. This explains why within a population there will always be small ‘hard core’ minorities that are unconditional supporters of the state and the insurgents.¹¹⁵ The majority of the population, even though they may have sympathies for one side (state) or the other (insurgent), are capable of being influenced to “support either side depending upon their predictions of the others’ behavior and the related estimates of each side’s prospects for victory”.¹¹⁶ Expectations of prosperity and victory can be adjusted more quickly, especially during a contest.¹¹⁷ The insurgent organization forces this cost-benefit decision on the targeted population by challenging the state for control. Figure 2 outlines this preference-behavior relationship.

Expectations of prosperity and victory are also more susceptible to *biased* information and provide the insurgent fertile ground to establish a following in order to challenge the state.¹¹⁸ Propaganda by the deed, local intimidation, and psychological operations are effective because, instead of challenging the structure of society, the insurgent manipulates the view of the public into believing the insurgent will be the eventual victor over the state. In doing so, the insurgency also takes advantage of the ‘bandwagon effect’ where portions of the population back the insurgency because of a desire to be on the winning side.¹¹⁹ A ‘bandwagon effect’ can also occur on the moral front where the insurgent’s ability to manipulate information also helps the insurgency

¹¹⁴ John E. Jackson, “Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions,” *American Political Science Review*, (August 1993).

¹¹⁵ Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen, “Revolutionary Origins and Conditional Mobilization,” *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol 12, Issue 3, (1996), 377-402. McCormick addressed this issue again in 2002 with Frank Giordano in an internal Naval Postgraduate School paper entitled, “The Dynamics of Insurgency.”

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Timothy Amato, “Expectations and Preferences in British General Elections,” *American Political Science Review*, (June 1994).

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

appear not only like the probable winner but also the ‘right’ winner as well. Moreover, by viewing the insurgency as the probable victor the population begins to adjust their calculation of future prosperity.

Initially, the calculation of prosperity may be strictly rational as the population determines what form of authority better serves their individual or group goals but this calculation can be skewed. As the expectation of victory swings towards the insurgent then expectations of prosperity also begin to swing. Now the rational calculation is based on asking the question: “if I don’t support the insurgency, what are my chances of prosperity if the insurgents win?” If the answer is “none” than most of the population will *prefer* the insurgency and behave in the manner the insurgents want. This puts the insurgency in *control* of the local area and allows the insurgents to establish a system to grow and mobilize support in order to progress through the phases of an insurgency. If the insurgency can control enough “local areas” and establish systems of growth, than they will be able to challenge the state.

Of course, analyzing an insurgency by focusing strictly on preferences, behavior, and cost-benefit analysis represents a rational view of an insurgency that may ignore some effects of the society. However, the insurgent will try to adjust the socio-economic preferences that most influence the behavior of the targeted population in order to achieve control. These preferences, and costs-benefits, may not be strictly tied to economic gains but also could be tied to moral and ethical gains as well.




Figure 2. Political Preference – Behavior Model.

In order to control the population and generate the support to defeat the government, the insurgent must do a difficult task: from a position of weakness present itself as the eventual winner. If the insurgent can do this, than it can start changing political preferences of the people first through the expectation of victory because it provides the quickest path to achieving political power with the contested population.

C. SUMMARY

Why is this important to air base defense? Any US air operation is a symbol of state power and not only the power of the US but also the power of whatever government allowed the US to operate from the air base. This makes an air base a critical target in demonstrating the strength of an insurgency and the corruption of the government the insurgency is challenging.

Unless the insurgents have overwhelming support, the insurgents must overcome their initial weakness by engaging in “symbolic violence” and local intimidation to

motivate local supporters to enhance the relative prospects of the insurgent organization's chance of winning.¹²⁰ The result is effective recruiting and the ability to conduct more symbolic violence and political intimidation (e.g., creating a climate of fear). If this insurgent mobilization is not disrupted by the state, a self-sustaining level of violence and mobilization may be achieved by the insurgents.¹²¹ This resulting situation will be very costly and difficult for forces of the state (and maybe more difficult for an external supporter such as the US) to reverse.

Some of the "symbolic violence" will certainly be attacks against air bases and attacks against the local population of workers and contractors that support the air base. In a battle over who will dictate the behavior of the local population, the insurgent almost always wins political power and the state (and the US as a supporter of the state) almost always loses political power every time the insurgent attacks, irregardless of whether an aircraft is damaged, a US serviceman is wounded or killed, or a local base contractor is ambushed and kidnapped.¹²² Each attack or political action strengthens the insurgent's grip on the population (and its ability to influence the US public), enhances the insurgent's ability to meet its instrumental goals through public support, and serves to strengthen the insurgent's internal organizational needs.

The impact of the air base attacks could be immediate and severe.¹²³ The host government may curtail or cancel the US operations from the base or the US public could demand the cancellation of the US mission for fear of further involvement, cost, or casualties. If either the host state or the US acquiesces to the insurgent violence, the insurgency will be emboldened and strengthened by such action.

¹²⁰ This is a rare case because normally some aspect is served by the state or the government would have never came to power.

¹²¹ McCormick and Owen, 377-402.

¹²² However, if an insurgent ambush results in an unacceptable level of casualties (loss of resources) captured than this would be a situation where the insurgent loses. An example is MRTA's raid on the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru that eventually resulted in the death or capture of MRTA's vital leadership. This is the reason why insurgents use tactics, bombings and standoff attacks, to avoid such damage.

¹²³ The 1964 attack on Bien Hoa air base resulted in the escalation of US involvement.

Therefore, air base defenders must stop attacks against the air base and the local population in order to attack the insurgent's COG (control of local population) and protect the US COG (US public opinion). The execution of attacks against an air base or its local area provides the insurgency an informational advantage in the contest with the state which is why the achievement of local security beyond the perimeter is a must. Only with the population behaving in a manner supportive to the host nation and US efforts will the insurgents be able to be targeted directly, neutralized, or marginalized. Without the population on their side, the insurgent system will be disrupted. If the insurgent's system of growth is disrupted over a period of time, than the incidents of air base attacks will also drop at an increasing rate as an insurgency is forced underground into a survival mode.

The powerful conclusion is that to be successful, an air base defense mission must operate like a counterinsurgency. In doing so, the defense of an air base can take on a strategic effect beyond just providing air power to the combatant commander but also contributing to the overall counterinsurgency and stabilization effort of the theater and protecting the US public's resolve in supporting the military mission.

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V. MODELS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The theories of counterinsurgency may provide the most dynamic models for an effective air base defense. At its core, effective counterinsurgency is essentially a diagram for achieving local security – *the same key task as air base defense*. For this thesis, two models of counterinsurgency have been selected to mold new principles for air base defense strategy: Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” and Julian Paget’s model of intelligence in a counterinsurgency.

A. MCCORMICK’S “MYSTIC DIAMOND” MODEL OF COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY¹²⁴




Figure 3. McCormick’s Model of Counterinsurgency at a National Level.

McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” model of insurgency and counterinsurgency strategy applies at all levels in an insurgent conflict. McCormick’s model provides a guiding strategy for interrupting the insurgent system of growth (Figure 1). As far as interpreting McCormick’s model, the US should be viewed as part of the “state” because the US will normally be a supporting element for a foreign state in its fight against

¹²⁴ Gordon McCormick, “Guerrilla Warfare,” (notes from presentation, Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004). This thesis only uses the top of the model. The bottom of the model deals with external support and is in Basilici and Simmons, “Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare,” 33.

insurgents regardless of whether that support is in the form of training, advisors, financial support, or through the actual use of US troops.¹²⁵

For the state fighting the insurgents, it is best to observe McCormick's model from a local perspective where the air base defense fight will happen.




Figure 4. McCormick's Model of Counterinsurgency at Air Base Defense/Local Level.¹²⁶

The model presents not an asymmetric struggle but a symmetric confrontation where the insurgent is poised against the state for control of the population. Each side is executing a progressive (can also be simultaneous) strategy to use the population as a base for destroying the opponent. Strategy A, population focused, strives to modify the behavior of the population to prefer the state over the insurgent. It seeks behavior and

¹²⁵ Stephen Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response," (2004). Retrieved on 11 Jan 2005 from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi>

¹²⁶ Basilici and Simmons, "Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare," 35.

compliance, not “hearts and minds” which is a long-term approach, through the adjustment of public preferences. McCormick would not say in instances where it is impossible for the population (Muslims?) to prefer the US but what could be achieved is that the insurgents could become *not preferred* by the public.

Strategy A directly targets the demand for the insurgency by co-opting the population. This is first achieved by protecting the population from the insurgent. *The tactical purpose of any air base defense mission must be to establish a secure local environment for the base and the local population.* This is more than just protect from the acts of terror or intimidation but isolating the insurgent informationally. As the population’s source of security and information, the state and, in the case of air base defense, air base defense forces attain legitimacy of action in the area. This is important since many times Air Force operations may have little if any local legitimacy because the focus of air operations normally does not target locals (humanitarian assistance is the obvious exception). However in the realm of air base defense, legitimacy allows for freedom of maneuver for base defense and AFOSI units and the public’s participation in intelligence and source networks. In this way, the defenders can achieve a level of situational awareness at least equal to or greater than the insurgents. Legitimacy also allows the effective use of tactical information operations and PSYOPS to dispense truthful but biased information to the public in order to expand the legitimacy of the state and discredit the insurgent. This constitutes information control.

As part of the effort to achieve legitimacy, the US will seek to execute training and advisory missions with local air base defense forces and police. Working with indigenous forces not only helps in co-opting the local population but also greatly strengthens the ability of the US to gather intelligence because information can be processed through trusted agents with knowledge of the local society. Although, certainly protecting the population and isolating the insurgent is the first step to co-opting the population, many tasks can be executed simultaneously. Particularly, the training and advisory mission where a more professional and effective local/indigenous base defense force will secure the base defense area that more quickly, efficiently, and, in many cases, more effectively than US forces alone. In the end, the state and base defense forces will

appear to the population as the winner in any local struggle and isolating the insurgent allows the US to dictate the information war among the local populace.

No matter the phase of an insurgency, Strategy A must always be implemented because the state must exert control in any contested area and extract information and intelligence. It is also the primary strategy in combating insurgency's in Krepinevich's Phase I or Phase II of growth. It is in Phase I and II that the population is the provider of insurgency protection and support.¹²⁷ If an insurgency has reached Phase III, the insurgents already have popular support and the state may target the insurgent's core forces directly (Strategy C).

Strategy B for the state represents interdicting the support structure of the insurgents. However, since the population is the source of support for the insurgents (unless an outside actor is the primary source of support), than this strategy is ineffective without Strategy A.¹²⁸ More importantly, the intelligence networks (along with follow-up investigation, not unlike standard criminal investigations) established during the execution of Strategy A allows the state and base defense forces to target the insurgent infrastructure discriminately – killing or capturing only those targeted, while safeguarding the public from indiscriminate force. Thus to avoid indiscriminate casualties will require more than superb intelligence but also restraint and sacrifice on the part of the counterinsurgent forces. Restraint and sacrifice in the fact that although the US can put a 500-pound bomb on any building it chooses, and sometimes that power must be intentionally displayed, but more often that level of force must be restrained and a more precise, dynamic type of force must be used (e.g., raid). This paints the US not as some weak force that hides behind technology and sandbags but as warriors who do not fear face-to-face battle and do not threaten “good” people. Sending this message is a moral victory and required to weigh the population’s calculation of victory decidedly in the counterinsurgent’s favor.

¹²⁷ Even if an insurgency has external support, it still requires the population for security from the state.

¹²⁸ If the insurgency is surviving off of external support than interdiction and some type of “border control” will be necessary at a local and state-level as may diplomatic and economic actions at a state-level.

As the insurgent is cutoff from its source of resources, legitimacy, recruiting, and information than it will be forced to react much like a criminal organization during a community crackdown, either 1) leave, 2) go underground (lower profile), or 3) fight. If the insurgency does choose to fight, this is an advantage to the state because greater situational awareness should result in more successful engagements with the enemy.

Engagements with lower-level operators will provide the state the opportunity to demonstrate its power and attrit the insurgent force. These engagements also provide opportunities to expand intelligence through the interrogation of captured enemy and the turning of some into sources for the state.¹²⁹ Offers of amnesty, rewards, and promises to those who defect weaken and break off parts of the insurgent infrastructure that can be destroyed or manipulated. As more intelligence is gathered, the core insurgent organization can be targeted directly.

Strategy C for the state represents the targeting the insurgent organization directly (i.e., the conventional approach of decisive engagement) but this too is an ineffective strategy without first using Strategy A to expose the insurgent organization and Strategy B to break it down. The effect of using Strategy C as the primary strategy has been devastating in Iraq with much of the ground forces tied up in force protection actions when not implementing “direct action” missions that provide neither presence nor the precision to combat the insurgency.¹³⁰ However, if Strategies A and B have been effectively executed than Strategy C is the “payoff” phase in an insurgency where US forces can do what they do best, defeat enemy forces in a decisive engagement.

For the insurgent, Strategy A, as was covered in Chapter III, is the only option initially because it is too weak to attack the core state power directly to challenge the state’s survival. More often than not, even attacks against the state (or its supporters like

¹²⁹ These would be AFOSI missions in accordance with HUMINT operations in the vicinity. These operations could even be expanded to the use of amnesty, harsh or lenient jail terms, or the creation of pseudo-gangs.

¹³⁰ Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

the US) are really a function of Strategy A since the attacks are aimed at the population's cost-benefit analysis and winning the information war. These attacks strengthen the insurgent's hold on their COG (the population) while attacking the US' COG (US public opinion). Rarely can insurgents, especially early on, do serious damage to the state. Air base attacks in Iraq by and large fall into this category. However, if the insurgents system of growth is not challenged, the insurgency may grow strong enough to eventually attack the state's support system and economy (Strategy B) or the core state itself (Strategy C).

B. PAGET'S MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN A COUNTER INSURGENCY¹³¹

Julian Paget argued that battling an insurgency is essentially a fight for intelligence and situational awareness in order to isolate and expose the insurgent to the power of the state (disrupting the insurgent system of growth). Paget developed six principles in using intelligence to defeat an insurgency.¹³²

Paget's first principle of intelligence in a counterinsurgency is to establish effective intelligence operations to detect an insurgency before the insurgency has chance to act.¹³³ This would be synonymous with trying to find an insurgency before it has even committed an act of symbolic violence. This does make sense in air base defense because air base operations are virtually impossible to keep hidden. Therefore, it should be assumed that if an air operation is going to be established for a period of time, it will attract local insurgents or international terrorists who are a part of a transnational insurgency. Either way, seeking out an insurgency eliminates the initial political space that an insurgency needs to establish its core. This action dissuades insurgent action or makes it difficult to attack the base and challenge the US mission in the information war. This is the "penetrate first" strategy.

¹³¹ The model for this section is based on Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare*. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967). RAND used Paget's model in a strategic analysis by Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Taw, *A Strategic Framework for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Operations*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992).

¹³² Appendix B presents Paget's principle in greater detail.

¹³³ It is possible this could be seen as an almost authoritarian penetration of a society but seeking out an insurgency prior to its development in this manner is very similar to the FBI's penetration of many white supremacist groups in the US that have yet to commit any violent acts.

Paget's second principle is gain knowledge of the enemy before the insurgency becomes a problem. Similar to the first principle, this principle dictates initiating counterinsurgency operations at the first sign of symbolic violence. Although not referenced in Paget's study, the first two principles basically require the state to act early or, in the case of the first principle, to act first. This is essentially the same concept as making a strategic first move in economic game theory. McCormick and Owen used economic game theory to analyze the importance of the state making a strategic first move against an insurgent.¹³⁴ In most cases, making a strategic first move against a budding insurgency will be decisive because the insurgency would probably not have had time to develop a foundation among the population for recruiting and support, or establish greater internal cohesion and motivation from the core insurgent group.¹³⁵ The insurgency will most likely respond by going underground where the inactivity will begin to destroy the group identity.

A conclusion drawn from this principle is that when an air base defense force moves into an air base with an insurgent or terrorist threat, it should implement off-base unconventional operations (i.e., counterinsurgency) in the local area as a first move because this brings the fight to where the insurgent is developing. The internally-focused conventional defense operation, effective against the saboteur, is the proper second move. This is an exact reversal of current USAF doctrine and training. Acting on this principle also dissuades insurgent action or makes it difficult to attack the base and challenge the US mission in the information war.

Paget's third principle of intelligence in a counterinsurgency is establishing a fully integrated intelligence and operations organization under a single commander. This is Paget's one principle of organization. The clearest example of this is the military-civil-police integrated operation that the British implemented successfully in Malaya. In the

¹³⁴ McCormick and Owen, 395-402. McCormick also covered the topic again with Giordano in 2002.

¹³⁵ In the case of the Khobar Towers bombings in 1996 for instance, this "act early" philosophy would have amounted to the implementation of more aggressive security measures in response to the attack at the Saudi Arabian National Guard six months prior to the bombing at Khobar Towers. Of course, this strategy is more effective as part of a larger counterinsurgent operation, but even executing a limited operation within 10 kilometers around Dhahran air base and the Khobar Towers complex may have sufficed in the detection, disruption, or the abandonment of the operation against Khobar Towers.

present, the US will normally not be the military *and* civilian authority but this does not negate the responsibility for the US to establish a single air base defense operation under a single commander that integrates fully with the local civil and police authorities.¹³⁶ As part of this principle, the air base commander should accept Civil-Military Operations responsibility for the area around the air base. The British Royal Air Force operates in such a manner and is a major reason for their success in Basra (as a later case study will attest).¹³⁷ This is a significant problem for the USAF.

The first problem is that USAF air base defense responsibility stops at the fence line (or some distance out from the perimeter based on the effective range of base defense weapons). The second problem is that Army and USAF forces have separate chains of command so integration is haphazard or based on consensus. The third issue is the separation of AFOSI within the Air Force coordinated defense operations through a single commander impossible. The British solve this problem by placing all defensive and Survive-to-Operate forces within the Ground Defense Area under the command of the RAF Force Protection Wing commander who reports directly to the wing commander.¹³⁸

AFOSI is certainly a potential asset to the defense but its separation from the overt intelligence and information that security forces are gathering and the security forces separation from AFOSI's information and intelligence ensures neither has clear situational awareness. Effective counterinsurgency is impossible without informed decisions, unified objectives, unified effort, and, if possible, unified command.

Paget's fourth principle is identifying the gathering of intelligence as the top priority of the security organization. This principle only reinforces the organizational

¹³⁶ The Combined Defense Operations Centers that operate in defense of US/ROK bases in the Republic of Korea are probably the closest examples of such an arrangement involving US forces.

¹³⁷ Army Commanders in Iraq who took CMO responsibility were the most effective at reestablishing order within their areas. Lt Gen Patreus, who commanded operations in northern Iraq, is the best example.

¹³⁸ Scott Millington (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), John Hall (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), Neal Rawlsthorne (Royal Air Force (RAF) Squadron Leader), and Thomas Miner (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK on 7-9 Mar 2005. The Force Protection Wing Commander is normally the senior ranking RAF Regiment Officer and is comparable to the USAF Defense Force Commander as defined in AFI 31-301, *Air Base Defense*.

mistake of AFOSI's separation from the security forces. However, the doctrinal strategy of the Army's conventional mindset is focused mainly on intelligence that supports decisive action – a waste of effort in a counterinsurgency. The USAF's internal view is even worse because it is standards-based and requires no intelligence support at all. Neither understands that every community around an air base is its own microclimate and every local counterinsurgency will be different based on that microclimate. Only intelligence and local knowledge can bridge the often large gap from doctrinal to strategy execution. Again, achieving an advantage in situational awareness will allow defense forces to interdict or minimize insurgent attacks and their effects in the informational realm.

Paget's fifth principle of intelligence in a counterinsurgency is to gain and maintain the cooperation of the populace. This is a “hearts and minds” approach but Paget presents it as a more limited, realistic model. The population does not have to innately ‘prefer’ the state but must, at least, cooperate and support the state and not the insurgent. Key to this is security and civic action. Civic action, to Paget, is not number of wells dug or supplies handed out (though this can help) but training civic administrators to do their jobs effectively and with the knowledge that they serve the public. The public must then be convinced that the civic administrators exist to serve them.¹³⁹ This is also part of McCormick's Strategy A. This principle is essential in winning the information war in the local area of the air base, achieving legitimacy in the population's eyes, and alleviating the fear of the local community.

Paget's sixth and final principle is to penetrate the insurgent organization. Paget suggests that if this can be accomplished, an insurgent organization can be quickly dismantled. McCormick would suggest this is impossible without an effective campaign that targets the population (who will expose the organization and allow state forces to gain knowledge on it) and the insurgency's support structure (if members of the

¹³⁹ Paget, 207-220; Civic administrators that Paget are most concerned about are the military, police, fire, judges, teachers and militia, although the idea pertains to all civil workers. This was also expressed by Edward Lansdale, *The Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia*. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972). Lansdale saw the key to hearts and mind was instilling in the civic administrators “ideas and ideals” that reflected democratic principles at a village level.

insurgency believe they are isolated from the population and that the state will win, they may be willing to defect).¹⁴⁰ As applied to air base defense this may have limited utility but only if AFOSI is separated from the core base defense mission. Penetrating an insurgent organization is a possible AFOSI mission but only as a part of larger strategy of a single defense force commander. However, penetration of other “friendly” institutions is also necessary. This is particularly important when it pertains to other forces involved in the base defense mission (indigenous base defense, police, and local military forces) and locals with political power such as a strongman, warlord, etc. US forces, whether in a lead or supporting role, must know where the loyalties of the other base defense organizations lie.

Paget’s Principles of Intelligence for Counterinsurgency were analyzed in 1992 by RAND as a basis for a strategic framework for countering terrorism and insurgency. RAND’s research showed that Paget’s third, fourth, and fifth principle (McCormick’s Strategy A for the state) were most predictive of a successful counterinsurgency.¹⁴¹ This would suggest that implementing Strategy A through the unified Military-Civil-Police command structure (Paget’s third principle) would be the optimal basis for counterinsurgency doctrine. And, if insurgents and terrorists are the real threat to air bases, the counterinsurgency strategy of intelligence and population security should be the basis for a new air base defense doctrine as well.

C. A NEW DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE – PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE BASED ON COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELS

Since the Korean War, the insurgent has been the main ground threat to air bases and in response the USAF and U.S. military has misapplied conventional measures to counter the unconventional tactics used by the insurgent. The results have been predominantly poor – every time the insurgent chooses to attack the air base, the insurgent succeeds. This includes over 1,000 air base attacks in Iraq and counting. The air base attacks are not normally damaging to US air operations, but the attacks do not have to be. With each air base attack, the insurgent is winning an information war among

¹⁴⁰ Or they may stop believing in the morality of their cause or the brutality of their tactics. This destroys the insurgent’s identity with the insurgent organization.

¹⁴¹ Hoffman and Taw, *Strategic Framework*, 119.

the local population in the area of the air base, the US population, and among the air base defense force who view their conventional attempts at stopping the insurgent stand-off attacks as futile.¹⁴²

The models of counterinsurgency (McCormick's and Paget's) provide a baseline for a new framework for base defense operations that seek to take the initiative away from the insurgent. McCormick's and Paget's models were developed principally from analysis of the successful counterinsurgencies in Malaya, Kenya, Philippines, and Peru (in the mid-1990's) and may not be directly applicable to air base defense. There are a couple reasons for this. One, none of the research and analysis of these counterinsurgencies ever considered the unique environment of the air base although both discuss the importance of local security. Two, both McCormick's and Paget's models are best understood from a strategic standpoint and are directly applicable at the strategic level; however, at the tactical level of the air base, the models tend to be simplistic and vague and force the user to extrapolate some conclusions.¹⁴³ Yet, McCormick's and Paget's models do identify enduring principles of counterinsurgency and local security that are directly translatable to air base defense. A comparison of McCormick and Paget quickly reveals these principles of air base defense.

Paget's model concentrates in four areas of emphasis. These four areas of emphasis break down into one area on time and timing; one area on organization; and two areas on strategy (intelligence and the population). McCormick's model does not speak to timing or organization but is strictly a model of three strategies. These strategies are: protect the population to isolate the insurgent and gain intelligence; target the insurgent infrastructure in order disable insurgent operations and expose the core group; and target the core organization directly with force. The common aspects of both models

¹⁴² Brair, "Assessing Air Base Defense"; United States Air Force Instruction 31-301, *Air Base Defense*, May 15, 2002 regards the standoff attack as very difficult to counter. In David Madrid, "Master of the Bayonet," (11 December 11, 2004). Retrieved on 1 Sep 2005 from <http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special40/articles/1211pbayonet11Z1.html>. Chief Master Sergeant Scott Dearduff received an Order of the Bayonet for excellence in air base defense and in his remarks commented how his forces could not counter the standoff threat at Baghdad airport. This situation was accepted by the Air Force and the US air base defense community as essentially unavoidable.

¹⁴³ This is true of McCormick's more so than Paget's which already focused on only one aspect of counterinsurgency: intelligence.

are evident in the context of principles of timing, principles of organization and objective, and principles of strategy.

Principles of timing compiled from the models of McCormick and Paget are: 1) act first or early and 2) maintain level of action. The sole principle of organization and objective is unity of command. Principles of strategy include: 1) protect the population, 2) isolate the insurgent, 3) gain intelligence superiority, 4) penetrate the insurgent organization, and 5) kill and/or capture the core insurgent group.

From these universal principles of counterinsurgency, new principles of air base defense have been developed along with a new concept of security. The USAF has historically viewed air base defense as something that can be solved with engineering or technical solutions that have equated the acquisition of sensors, the placement of barriers, and the posting of forces as “security”. This type of security limits the impact, the physical destruction itself, of an enemy attack but has often failed at eliminating the ability of the enemy from continuing to attack. This approach has ignored the human components of knowledge, influence, and control as a different path to security. McCormick’s and Paget’s perspective of security is reflected in the security approaches taken by element of the special forces.

U.S. Army Special Forces units in Bosnia and Afghanistan are clear examples that the ability to interact, influence, and, when needed, control a population is the basis for true freedom of maneuver and security.¹⁴⁴ In Bosnia, penetrating knowledge of the local area, familiarity with local officials and important figures, and the ability to generate desired situational outcomes, with precise and deliberate force when necessary, allowed these small exposed units to operate freely throughout high threat areas without a single

¹⁴⁴ Security for the US Special Operations Joint Commission Observers in Bosnia was outlined in Charles T. Cleveland’s 2001 Army War College paper titled *Command and Control of the Joint Commission Observer Program: U.S. Army Special Forces in Bosnia*. Liaison elements that operated in Kosovo used a similar successful approach to security. In Afghanistan, the security environment established by Army Master Sergeant Mark Bryant and his special forces team is recounted in Basilici and Simmons, “Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare,” 42. The British model of camp and base security is also based on a “situational awareness” approach that allows the implementation of dynamic and passive proactive and reactive measures. This is based on a handout of the RAF’s perspective of a “Balance of Force Protection Effort” provided by Squadron Leader Neal Rawlsthorne and interviews with RAF Regiment Wing Commander’s Scott Millington and John Hall.

casualty. This is not to say that an air base is analogous to a small special forces team or that air bases should be “open” to promote interaction but air base defenders must understand that sandbags, barriers, and fields of fire only allows a base to more effectively absorb enemy punishment. It does not prevent enemy attacks, deter enemy action, or, with intelligence, strike the enemy first. The New Principles of Air Base Defense presented below (and in Appendix B) use counterinsurgency theory to develop a new approach to defense that protects the friendly forces’ freedom of action in the air base’s physical, informational, and moral realm and denies these realms from the insurgent.

1. Act First

The first proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is Act First. This is unique because besides for brief mention in a joint publication of sending out patrols immediately after occupying an air base, timing as a principle of air base defense does not exist. Act First does not define a tactic to be implemented (such as Protection and Penetration) or an organizational imperative (Unity of Effort) but, along with Perseverance, is a principle of time. To understand the importance of acting first, it must be understood that any operation at a forward air base will attract attention, including that of local and transnational insurgents and terrorists. Put simply, if a threat did not exist before, it will as soon as US aircraft arrive. The USAF would be wise to be looking for it. Remembering the lesson of McCormick and Paget, acting first can crush an insurgency before it begins.

The method for implementing the principle of “Act First” is the employment of counter-insurgent air base defense tactics before or no later than the arrival of US aircraft. This can be achieved in one of two ways: 1) operational preparation of the environment (OPE) or 2) advanced force operations.

The Air Force security forces do not have a deep history of Advanced Force Operations or Training and Assistance missions (also called Foreign Internal Defense) that are more typical for special forces. The special forces have done numerous Joint Combined Exercise and Training (JCET) deployments and other assistance missions to influence local security environments around the globe and help prepare battlefields for

possible US intervention. Air Force security forces have done Deployments for Training (DFT) in Latin America that are very similar to JCET's except the DFT's trained indigenous base defense forces.¹⁴⁵ With an expanded view of training for base defense to include not only the forces on the base but also the local police, militia, and military units that are responsible for the external security situation as well, these training and assistance missions could make a substantial impact on future air base defense for USAF operations. This dramatic impact is because competent local and base indigenous security forces will have functional intelligence and communication channels with the local population, legitimacy with the local population, knowledge of the local environment, knowledge of US operations, and capabilities to counter enemy forces. The result is effective defense of the air base and efficient use of US resources since much of the base defense mission will be executed through USAF advisors with indigenous security forces.¹⁴⁶

Of course the argument can be made that there are thousands of airfields throughout the world and trying to predict which environment to prepare with training and assistance missions would be impossible; however, this is a short-sighted view. In 2002, RAND published a study on the limited number of airfields due to infrastructure and political limitations that are actually available for use by the Air Force.¹⁴⁷ If one analyzes this data in conjunction with airfields that the Air Force prefers to use as hubs

¹⁴⁵ The author was the team leader for Deployment for Training 7009 to Peru in 1997.

¹⁴⁶ This emphasis on training, assistance, and advising also solves the Air Forces problem of perceived Status of Forces Agreement restrictions in performing off-base defense missions. This is because nearly all SOFA's restrict "unilateral military actions" but encourage training and assistance relationships. This is why any airlift pilot can describe how in South America US air base defense forces must remain on the base but US Special Operations Forces operate throughout many countries, *assisting and advising* indigenous military forces.

¹⁴⁷ Christopher J. Bowie, *The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases*. (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002). Although the report focused on the vulnerability of forward air bases and the need for long-range global task forces and "air base ships", it mistakenly ignored that forward air bases are a requirement for future warfare because of the need for airlift regardless of strike aircraft.

for airlift during times of peace than an initial list of airfields to be prepared for future use could be generated.¹⁴⁸

Whether the USAF current does or does not have qualified personnel to execute Advanced Force, Training and Advising, or Operational Preparation of the Environment missions with indigenous forces is not a point worth debating, the USAF must do it in order to Act First.¹⁴⁹ The advisors/trainers must be the best and eager to work with indigenous forces and interpreters must be plentiful. These personnel must be USAF's most intelligent, adaptive, energetic, assertive, and charismatic in order to be successful because instilling competence and confidence in an indigenous force while combating corruption is not the environment for the marginal or the meek.

And by acting first the US can ensure certain outcomes. First, the US can compress the initial operating space for the insurgent. Second, the US can force the insurgent to expend more effort and resources to attack the base or choose not to attack at all. Third, acting first will threaten the insurgency's survival by forcing the insurgency to raise its profile in order to garner more resources or go into a dangerous period of inactivity. Finally, the population immediately sees the US level of effort and commitment instead of an invisible force behind sandbags. These outcomes result in a positive first impression of US and indigenous defense forces, a perception of the relative weakness of the insurgents compared to the defense forces, and the defense forces' ability to dictate the local information war from the earliest stage. This allows US forces to send and control "the message" of any confrontation that occurs in the local area – disabling the insurgent's system of growth. Iraq provides examples of the advantage of Acting First and the disadvantage of ignoring this principle.

¹⁴⁸ For Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, air bases the US had used often in the past were the first bases chosen for buildup to support air operations. These include airfields in Kyrgyzstan, northern Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, and Tajikistan.

¹⁴⁹ The training and advisory missions could also serve to politically help prepare the environment as well by establishing a relationship with a host country's military that would serve to encourage allowing US access to air bases for use in a crisis. For more on the anti-access threat to air bases, see Christopher J. Bowie's 2002 report for Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments titled, *The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases*.

Of the air bases defended by US forces in Iraq, only Bashur and Tallil took advantage of Acting First. When the 786th Security Forces Squadron was air dropped into Bashur airfield in northern Iraq in 2003, they found a capable indigenous air base and local defense force to link up with.¹⁵⁰ This force was the Kurdish militia that had received years of US assistance and were advised by US Special Forces for training and operational guidance. This OPE operation allowed an effective air base defense to be immediately established and remains an area hostile to the insurgency.

Another example of the dramatic impact Act First can have is the strategic and decisive first move by the Marines to immediately enact aggressive civic action and local security measures at Al Nasiriyah, the site of numerous ambushes on US forces during the initial phases of the war, immediately upon the occupation of the area.¹⁵¹ As a result of the decisive first move by the Marines, the area has stayed quiet for most of the US military's time in Iraq. Consequently, nearby Tallil air base has remained largely unattacked even though until recently the defenders of Tallil ignored the local population.¹⁵² The initial actions of the Marines still reverberated with a positive impact two years later. The current Air Force security forces commander at Tallil has recognized his shortfall in the gathering of intelligence from the local population and energized interaction and involvement with the public.¹⁵³

As far as the other air bases in Iraq, air base defense forces, Air Force or Army, have not been involved in training or assisting local Iraqi Army or Police forces. In fact,

¹⁵⁰ Louis A. Arana-Barradas, "Bashur Airfield on roll; future not set," *Air Force Print News Service*, (April 14, 2003). Retrieved on 1 Sep 2005 from <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=41403930>.

¹⁵¹ Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant) and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005. Kerry Sanders, "Return to An Nasiriyah," (March 17, 2004). Retrieved on 28 May 2005 at <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4532423/>. Jason Johnson, (US Marine Corps 1st Lieutenant), email communication with author, 3 May 2005. Lt Johnson was part of the Marine CAP teams in Iraq, and although An Nasiriyah was a success, Johnson states that predominantly Sunni areas have been a failure against the insurgency. It is possible that since the Marines fought the tough "Battle of An Nasiriyah" in March-April 2003, they may have established a more powerful local security system than they did in areas that were defeated more easily.

¹⁵² Melissa Phillips, "Airmen establish early warning network with locals," *407th Air Expeditionary Group Public Affairs*, (June 17, 2005). Retrieved on 19 June 2005 from <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123010806>.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

it was not until the spring of 2005 that Air Force security forces accepted a training and assistance mission with Iraqi police forces but this was part of a larger effort with Army military police and was not coordinated as part of an air base defense effort. By not taking advantage of this opportunity, the Air Force not only violated the principle of Act First, but Protection and Unity of Effort as well.

2. Unity of Effort

The second proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is Unity of Effort. Unity of Effort is a principle of organizational imperative and objective. Without unified action, the insurgents will find and expose fractures in the base defense. Although Paget used the term Unity of Command, he was referring to the British's ability in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus to link the military-government-police organizations because the British were the government in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. The US has not had this situation available except after World War II and during the Coalition Provisional Authority's duration as the government of Iraq. Therefore, the US must influence allied and indigenous defense force and local political authorities to view the execution of the base defense mission the same way and strive for the same short and long-term objectives. The objectives not only must be the same but the method for achieving the objectives must be identical, or near to it. Critical to ensuring this unity of effort is the unity of command among external elements (such as US and allies) and the integration of intelligence operations of all defense forces. If AFOSI hides intelligence from the security forces, if the US hides intelligence from allies, or if indigenous forces hide intelligence from US forces, the defense will suffer.

However, if defense forces are unified, then the outcomes for the base defense are significant. Often, this unity of effort requires a single US authority that is engaged and charismatic with the local political apparatus and the indigenous defense forces. This should be the wing commander or a high-ranking official that works directly for the wing commander.

As mentioned previously, with a unified effort, information and intelligence can be viewed through a lens of local knowledge and contacts in order to provide a greater level of understanding. The establishment of trust among all base defense forces allows

for efficiency of operation as each component can be trusted to act independently or in collaboration with another. The result is the defense is able to maintain a pace of operations that the insurgents cannot match. Moreover, this trust and integration not only allows an increased pace of operations but also a distributed defense operation where base defense forces are active throughout a large region which reduces insurgent operating space. This is also what makes effective small-unit action possible.

The unity of effort and objective must penetrate through the defense organization to the lowest levels so small units understand what they must do in order to achieve the base defense and counter-insurgent objectives. Units from the sector and flight-level down to the fire team must continuously communicate with the public as well as be able to decide and act near autonomously in order to deny the insurgent initiative. To act in this decentralized manner, control must be delegated down to the lowest level. This means that the base defense operations center must often allow the lowest level to control sensor assets, communications, friendly forces, and the population. The command center must play a supporting role in order to ensure the right resources, technology, firepower, and training is ensured. The small unit focus prevents paralysis of action by defense forces due to leadership trying to attain the precise level of situational awareness that the small unit has already attained. The answer is let the small unit lead. This allows the defense force to Act First in order to preempt or disrupt an insurgent attack.

Just as important Unity of Effort is that no base defense force usurp the operations of another and threaten the ability for the base defense forces to dominate to information war against the insurgent by using indiscriminate force and brutal tactics (unless part of a intentional base defense operation).

3. Protection

The third proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is Protection. Along with Penetration, Protection is a principle of strategy. Protecting the population and isolating the insurgent are key components to Paget's and McCormick's models for counter-insurgency and are also key in the defense of the base. However, in terms of air base defense, "protection" takes on an even broader definition. Not only must the defense forces protect the population, as in McCormick's model, but also

protect the base and US personnel as well. The base and the US personnel represent a direct link to US COG – US public opinion. And the local population is the COG of the insurgent. The US must protect its own COG while isolating the insurgent from its COG. This is achieved through presence, train/advise indigenous forces, intervention and conflict resolution, restraint, deliberate force, civic action, and force protection.

Presence by the combined base defense must be a 24/7 effort that is visible throughout the area that is sought to be influenced. This is the first step in showing the state's intention of being the winner in the counter-insurgent struggle. Patrolling is normally the preferred tactic to achieve presence but this is not the periodic patrolling that is often cited as the Air Force's "cure-all" of base defense. Just as a cop on the beat appears to always be around talking and relating to the public, patrols in the vicinity of the air base must do the same and this means on foot. The concept is similar to community-policing in this sense. In a community-policing operation, the police are present, or at least are perceived to be, in a community constantly and the result is a reduction in the fear of crime, and fear in general, in the high-crime communities.¹⁵⁴ The reduction in fear in a community ravaged by crime is analogous to the community viewing the police as the eventual winner. The presence builds public trust and confidence by protecting the public from the insurgent influence and forces the insurgent to either: go away, go underground, or challenge the defense forces.¹⁵⁵

In the context of a counterinsurgency, this becomes a "policing" approach with firepower, not dissimilar to John McCuen's (1972) tactical approach to counterinsurgency that he espoused in his book, *The Art of Counterrevolutionary Warfare*. McCuen argued that small teams must be established to police, communicate, and work with the public. These small teams must be supported by larger maneuver units that are also present, visible, and ready to react at all times to ensure the small teams can focus on the public and not on their own survival.¹⁵⁶ This is a "police leads, military

¹⁵⁴ Gary Potter, email communication with author, 22 Jul 2004.

¹⁵⁵ Max Manwaring, *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*, (2005). Retrieved on 11 Jan 2005 from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi>

¹⁵⁶ John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counterrevolutionary Warfare*. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1972); Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*. (New York: Brassey's Inc., 1990) 128-130.

supports” approach that has been the basis of successful counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya, Philippines, Kenya, and El Salvador. Only a military police force has the established skills, expertise, and experience to perform these police and paramilitary police roles but also military police units are the only US forces experienced to train and advise indigenous police units “soft” police skills such as interviews, traffic control, vehicle registration, use of technology (sensors, cameras, etc.,) evidence gathering, etc. Moreover, military police units can also train paramilitary police skills such as crowd and riot control, armored vehicle operations, and SWAT-style raids.

Air Force security forces units are ideally suited to Presence. Not only do security forces units understand the importance of Presence and how Presence relates to the reduction of fear, interaction with the population, and the creation of trust. Moreover, security forces have a vast background of acting in small units while performing air base defense at expeditionary locations and police duties at home station. However, security forces, which normally operate in squad-size units, may need more experience in larger unit operations to support small unit actions. In the end, presence in the community adjusts the preferences of the public to favor the state because it shows the dedication of the state to win.

Intervention and Conflict Resolution is also key to achieving the principle of Protection. This is also a “police leads” approach. Base defense forces must be more than just seen but must *act* at the lowest level possible. Only by protecting the public against the acts of the insurgents, criminals, critical or dangerous incidents, etc., will the state’s forces look strong, supportive of the public, and dominate the moral ground. Intervention shows the public that counter-insurgent forces are concerned about the population and not just the insurgents. It also shows individual sacrifice at the personal level. This develops into a moral authority that disrupts the insurgent’s system of growth because it attacks the insurgent’s narrative of being the “moral force”. It encourages the public to expose the insurgents because the insurgent is no longer viewed as representing the community. A security force that is present in the community and intervening on the community’s behalf will be recognized as *legitimate* in the population’s eyes and earn the population’s allegiance.

Maintaining legitimacy is also greatly influenced by the application of force. Restraint speaks to power and moral authority of the defense force. Just as policemen are taught, force must be appropriate to the situation and discriminate force must be standard for all counter-insurgent forces in order to be viewed as an element of the state that serves the public. And when force, to include deadly force against the core insurgent organization, must be applied it must be done precisely and deliberately to demonstrate the competence, capability, and power of the defense force.

Just as with Presence, security forces already have the perspective as police to understand the importance of Intervention, Conflict Resolution, Restraint, and Deliberate Force as it applies to serving and securing the public in order to achieve legitimacy. Non-military police Army units may not inherently understand these aspects of Protection and instead equate everything to the use of force. And “the more force, the better” will not work around an air base because an air base cannot just move to a different area if the population reacts bitterly to the Army’s approach to security. An air base must exist with that population, no matter the situation, unless the US is willing to cancel the air operations at a possibly high political cost.

Training and Advising Indigenous Forces maximizes the amount of personnel contributing to the counter-insurgent and base defense fight and greatly expands local knowledge and intelligence gathering capabilities. A long-term impact is that it establishes military-to-military or security forces-to-police contacts that may develop a positive opinion of the US in the area and help support future US air operations. Training and advising indigenous forces is a vital step in base defense because it facilitates Acting First through either OPE or advanced force operations, ensures Unity of Effort through liaison actions, and ensures the Perseverance of base defense actions beyond the US presence.

Related to the training and advising aspect of Protection is Civic Action. Civic Action is primarily training indigenous security forces, training/assisting all other first responders, and ensuring the proper execution of any US sponsored project and, possibly,

the projects of our allies as well.¹⁵⁷ These activities represent the major competencies that are expected by a population of the state. Once these competencies are ensured, the other activities of the state and commerce can commence. Most likely, this will require base assistance to Army Civil Affairs personnel but may have to be accomplished even if Civil Affairs is absent.¹⁵⁸ These civil-military activities help the state eventually act without the assistance of external forces (i.e., the US) and provide a tangible benefit to the state for accepting the political risk of allowing US air operations. As the population experiences the benefits of the states rule and the costs of supporting the insurgent, the population will become the primary engine for informed local knowledge (Penetration).¹⁵⁹ Civic action, however, may become a more expanded operation, especially if projects or services by the host government or non-governmental organizations (NGO) are in danger of failure and intelligence assesses that the failure will be blamed on the US military. In this respect, the air base may be forced to establish a temporary or permanent Civil-Military Operations Center to better coordinate the civic action projects (not to include training of indigenous forces) between the US, the host government and NGO's.

The Force Protection aspect of Protection cannot be risk avoidance as has become custom in the Air Force and Army. Too often base defense operations stay within the base perimeter and allow the insurgent to operate freely and dictate the time and place of attack. This risk avoidance approach also undermines the principle of Protection by restricting presence and intervention of base defense forces and cannot ensure a secure local environment. This also undermines the principle of Penetration and prevents the extraction of intelligence from the community. However, Force Protection is essential and can be executed smartly without inhibiting other operations. Force Protection

¹⁵⁷ First responders normally constitute police, fire department, medical units, and EOD.

¹⁵⁸ The Air Mobility Warfare Center in Fort Dix, NJ has been training Air Force O-6's for several years on the importance of civil-military operations from the air base and uses case studies from Africa and Asia where deployed air base commanders had to establish civil-military operations in the absence of Army Civil Affairs personnel. An air base has essential support capabilities for civil affairs to include medical operations, civil engineering, transportation, contracting, finance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.

¹⁵⁹ Leites and Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority*, pp. 12.

requires intelligent security procedures for internal base security and the use of technology to protect US base defenders and *minimize* risk while *maximizing* the capabilities of off and on-base operations. As it applies to off-base operations, the identification, vehicle registration, checkpoints, barriers, berms, sensors, and cameras that are usually a part of an internal Force Protection plan, are important to counterinsurgency off-base. These systems can be used to establish and enforce a circulation control plan in, out, and throughout an area that allows defense forces to either force the insurgent into an environment the defenders control (i.e., the checkpoint) or to flee the area. Either way, the insurgent is denied sanctuary and mobility.

Force Protection is vital to protecting the US center of gravity and thus allowing the USAF to put more effort into challenging the insurgent's center of gravity.

4. Penetration

The fourth proposed principle of air base defense that will be examined is Penetration. Penetration is the other principle of strategy and is linked with Protection. By establishing Protection of the population that breaks the insurgent's link with the population, Penetration efforts use that security groundwork to achieve a level of situational awareness and intelligence equal to that of the insurgent. Penetration is intelligence-gathering, investigation, evaluation of other friendly forces, and evaluation of the success of the base defense effort. Penetration is not just the penetration of the insurgency, though certainly the ultimate goal, but also is penetration of the population, friendly forces, and local political officials.

Penetration of friendly forces is essential because it reinforces that trust that must exist to achieve a unity of effort. Penetrating other friendly forces constitutes establishing a network to ensure other friendly forces are not intentionally hindering friendly operations or supporting enemy operations. As has been discovered in Iraq, friendly forces have often supported insurgent attacks against air bases.¹⁶⁰

Local political officials have also been suspected of supporting air base attacks in Iraq as well. AFOSI would be the lead in establishing a network to ensure indigenous

¹⁶⁰ Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

politicians are not intentionally hindering friendly operations or supporting enemy operations. If local political officials were cooperating with enemy forces, civic action would certainly be unsuccessful unless the political officials were replaced. This may be an option for an air base commander, whether by direct or indirect means.

In essence, the principle of Protection is supporting to Penetration. The purpose of protecting the population is to establish a program and a network to gather information from the population to expose insurgent infrastructure and leaders as well as other friendly forces. This is through more than just AFOSI sources but will often depend on timely information gathered by police and patrols (e.g., through observation, idle conversation, and field interviews). The focus of intelligence-gathering and action must be at the lowest level, with those forces that interact directly with the population and indigenous forces. Intelligence analysis must be aligned at low a level as possible in the organization order to analyze and assess intelligence quickly and get it back to small, operational units for action. Of course, the best option is to place intelligence personnel with each maneuver unit but this may not be possible. This type of organization reduces the need for large number of analysts at higher levels because much of the information going up to BDOC or AOC was already analyzed at a lower level.

Penetrating the population also allows the insertion of information by base defense forces as part of an information operations or tactical PSYOP mission to influence public opinion. This also must be empowered to the small-unit (flight or squad). Imagine responding to a car bomb that, despite the efforts of the responding base defense forces, kills numerous people. And, with the help of an interpreter, base defense forces on the spot print flyers from the back of a HMMWV in order get the message to the population about how the incident happened, the impact, the need to stop this from happening again and a request for assistance. As an overt force, this is an advantage the defense forces enjoy because it allows the US and indigenous forces to Act First in the psychological arena – and often what is heard first is believed. The covert insurgent organization will not have the same advantage of immediately and overtly expounding on their actions without exposing themselves to the power of the base defense force.

And finally, to Paget's ultimate counterinsurgent principle – friendly forces penetrating the insurgent organization and exposing the core insurgent organization. Once insurgents are identified, defense force leaders must decide whether to capture and interrogate or observe to see if other links to the insurgency can be exposed. This requires the population to be supportive of the counter-insurgent forces since most surveillance is often detectable by some portion of the public. If captured and interrogated, offers of amnesty, rewards, or leniency in sentencing may be employed in combination with a harsher alternative in order to gather information or use captured forces as agents for the state.¹⁶¹

The principle of Penetration is the principle of intelligence and investigation and, therefore, exposes the insurgents to the discriminate force of the base defense forces and the state to kill insurgent cadre (i.e., Protection). Penetration provides information to interdict insurgent violence and detects insurgent attempts to manipulate information. And it allows an evaluation of the trustworthiness of other base defense elements and a systematic approach to evaluate the ability of the defense force to meet the air base defense measures of effectiveness (Appendix C).

5. Perseverance

The fifth and final principle of air base defense is Perseverance. Perseverance is a principle of timing and effort and is synonymous with will. It provides another moral component to the base defense mission. Perseverance means that the state will not be outlasted or out-willed. Perseverance in this way means that once the insurgent's operating space is attacked than that level of effort is maintained in order to not allow the insurgency maneuver to adjust and grow. The reason for this is that both counterinsurgencies and air bases tend to be long-term commitments for the US.¹⁶² The US has numerous bases in the Middle East that were initially thought to be temporary but have been used continuously or intermittently for over fifteen years. Since 9/11, the US has established several more bases throughout Southwest and Central Asia that appear

¹⁶¹ This is similar to the concepts of “double-agents” or “pseudo-gangs”. Normally, this is not a regional action an air base would institute on its own but as part of a larger strategy.

¹⁶² The exception to the long-term use of air bases is those operated in a response to a natural disaster or small-scale humanitarian assistance.

will be used by the US for many years to come. So if the US initially disables an insurgent threat at an air base, it must maintain that level of effort in the base defense because the air base operation may be continuous for a decade or more which provides time for an insurgency to reestablish itself or the emergence of another insurgent organization. As with Act First, the base defense effort should start before the air base operations and continue through the completion of the air base mission. Perseverance ensures that the US does not leave the local security situation around the air base worse than when the US arrived.

D. SUMMARY

Conventional Army operations are based on decisive action against known enemy targets and conventional USAF air base defense is centered around the hope that the enemy takes decisive action against the base and then defeating the enemy. Neither have been successful against the insurgent. The models of counterinsurgency, McCormick's and Paget's, provide a framework for combating an insurgent threat to air bases enemy that Joint and USAF base defense doctrine have been unsuccessful at defeating. Paget's principles of timing, organization, and intelligence were linked with McCormick's principles of protecting the population, isolating the insurgent infrastructure, and destroying the core insurgent organization in order to develop a new framework of air base defense and local security.

From this new framework, New Principles of Air Base Defense have been extrapolated: 1) Act First, 2) Unity of Effort, 3) Protection, 4) Penetration, and 5) Perseverance in order to execute the air base defense mission against an insurgent. These principles instruct base defense forces in how to eliminate the insurgent's freedom of action and, therefore, the insurgent's ability to execute information attacks against the US mission. These principles provide the doctrinal basis to guide and evaluate air base defense strategy and develop functional measures of effectiveness (Appendix C).

However, we must find out if these New Principles are descriptive and predictive of a successful air base defense in the "real world". To do so, case studies where unconventional air base defense strategies were employed in Vietnam and Iraq will be evaluated using the New Principles.

VI. CASE STUDIES

This paper has argued that the insurgent is the primary threat to air bases and that to defeat the insurgent threat, unconventional warfare strategies must be implemented along with smart security measures that exist in the current Air Force doctrine. Based on this requirement, four historical cases of air base defense against an active insurgent will be examined to measure the validity of the argument for the New Principles of Air Base Defense.

A. METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The analysis of cases will be presented in a chronological manner beginning with two cases from the Vietnam War, Da Nang air base and Tuy Hoa air base, and finishing with two cases from the current conflict in Iraq, Basra air base and Balad air base. The historical cases will provide accounts of the air base defense activities and quantitative data on the amount of enemy activity each base sustained over the timeline reviewed. It is the measure of the strength of the enemy, the number of enemy attacks, and the intensity of the attacks that these cases will use to determine the ability of air base defense forces to disrupt the insurgent attacks and the success of the air base defense.

Each case is analyzed qualitatively using the New Principles of Air Base Defense based on McCormick's "Mystic Diamond" and Paget's Model of Intelligence in a Counterinsurgency. The New Principles show a direct correlation with the quantitative data and appear to be descriptive and predictive of a successful air base defense effort.

B. CASE SELECTION CRITERIA

Vietnam and Iraq were the conflicts chosen for analysis because both provide the only well-accounted, long-term data on an aggressive threat to an air base. Other air bases that experienced attacks were considered, to include the Mogadishu airport in Somalia and Illopango air field in El Salvador. However, limited data concerning the amount and intensity of the attacks each base sustained led to these air bases being eliminated from consideration as part of the case studies but even the scant data available supports the thesis of this paper.

The attacks against Illopango air field were not successively dealt with by the El Salvador Air Force until after the insurgency began to lose ground against the government.¹⁶³ Yet when negotiations in 1990 began between the FMLN insurgents and the El Salvador government, the insurgents demonstrated their power by attacking Illopango again (essentially an informational attack).

The attacks against the Mogadishu airport in 1993 were not countered by Pakistani forces because it was felt that the attacks did not cause any significant damage to the airfield and were just harassment.¹⁶⁴ It is unclear if these attacks helped embolden the Somali warlords that would eventually execute the ambush on the Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993. There is no data of air base attacks while the US Marines guarded Mogadishu airport in January-March 1993. It is known, however, that the Marines guarded Mogadishu with active patrols and engagement with the public and the warlords.

Possibly the most interesting case not observed is that of the Marine air base defense in Beirut in 1983. The Marines did execute presence patrolling that amounted essentially to driving around the area, which is not that dissimilar to Army base defense operations in Balad, Iraq in December 2004.¹⁶⁵ This had the dual effect of establishing a footprint of US force while doing nothing to defend it but to be fair to the Marines there was political constraints they were forced to deal with because of the peacekeeping nature of the mission.¹⁶⁶ Essentially, the Marine experience at Beirut points to the need to establish a robust intelligence gathering and analysis operation and the need to

¹⁶³ Jorge Parada (El Salvadoran Air Force Colonel), in discussion with author, 24 May 2005. Colonel Parada was assigned to Illopango from 1986 to 1990 as a helicopter pilot. Colonel Parada recalled at least six separate air base attacks during his time at the base. Although he was no longer assigned to Illopango at the time of the last attack in late 1990, he recalled that the air base attack was interpreted as a message from the FMLN that the FMLN was still a significant threat. Vick, 155-160, references a major attack at Illopango in 1982.

¹⁶⁴ Mateen Mizra (Pakistani Army Major), in discussion with author, 16 Jul 2005. Major Mizra said the Pakistani forces that were a part of the defense of Mogadishu did not see the attacks as warranting much of a response because of the limited damage the attacks caused.

¹⁶⁵ Bean, “Era of Terrorist Threats,” 36. The Marines did perform patrolling but with no objective beyond “presence”. The patrols did not seek intelligence or engagement. The Marines depended on the Lebanese Armed Forces to perform the external security of the air base.

¹⁶⁶ Bean, 36-37. The Marines were directed to take a “non-combatant” role which discouraged the aggressive show of force or the build-up of defenses on the air base.

implement those internal security measures the Air Force is so well versed at executing.¹⁶⁷ In the end though, Beirut constituted only a single attack that provides a somewhat weak position to draw conclusions from.

Da Nang and Tuy Hoa were selected from Vietnam because these were the two air bases that employed some unconventional tactics the longest; had similar threats; and similar terrain.¹⁶⁸ Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were also considered but both did not implement aspects of an unconventional strategy until after the Tet Offensive in 1968 and replacement of General William Westmoreland with General Creighton Abrahms.

Continuing with the similarities between Da Nang and Tuy Hoa, a 1969 USAF intelligence report described the threat at all both Da Nang and Tuy Hoa as “CRITICAL” even though Da Nang had the highest threat of any Vietnamese air base.¹⁶⁹ However, Da Nang was a base used by the French in the war for independence which meant the VC/NVA could fall back on the experience of the Viet Minh in attacking Da Nang. Tuy Hoa was constructed more recently, beginning in 1964. That said, both Da Nang and Tuy Hoa were along routes of infiltration. Da Nang was located along the primary infiltration from the north across the DMZ and Tuy Hoa was located along the central highland infiltration route. Da Nang and Tuy Hoa were air bases located along the coast and had similar terrain and population density near the base. In each case, the population density was 12,000-20,000 people within a 5km radius from the perimeter.¹⁷⁰ Each base had the same directives on internal security from Seventh Air Force security staff.¹⁷¹

Some differences between Da Nang and Tuy Hoa that could account for the possibility of skewed were that Da Nang was directed to have 8,000-meter deep defense

¹⁶⁷ Bean, “Era of Terrorist Threats,” 35. The Marines did receive warning of nearly 100 car bomb threats prior to the attack on 23 Oct 1983; however, they were unable to penetrate the population or insurgent organization to disrupt the attack and did not establish effective security procedures at the air base.

¹⁶⁸ Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut were also excellent candidates for analysis. An extremely detailed analysis of the defense of Tan Son Nhut, focusing on the attack of 31 January 1968, is available in Benjamin J. Hettingja’s 2002 thesis for the Air Force Institute of Technology titled *The Defense of Tan Son Nhut, 31 January 1968: A Study in the Nature of Air Base Security*.

¹⁶⁹ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 220.

¹⁷⁰ Vick, *Snakes*, 98.

¹⁷¹ Fox, 79-87.

areas to prevent stand-off attacks in 1966.¹⁷² Tuy Hoa was not directed to create such an extensive defense area. AFOSI had a more comprehensive source network at Da Nang.¹⁷³ Finally, Da Nang had major military headquarters (III MAF) on the installation while Tuy Hoa did not.

Two base defense operations in Iraq are analyzed: Basra and Balad. Basra air base is defended by the RAF Regiment. Basra does not have a large footprint of British forces on station but is Iraq's second most active civilian airport as well as supporting British strike and special operations air frames. The population density in the area of Basra is at least equal to Balad with most of the population being Shia and Basra is located within miles of the Iranian border. Basra experienced enemy activity for the first 15-18 months of its operation but has been quiet recently even though criminal elements are beginning to be a problem.

Balad has been Iraq's most attacked air base and is located in the dangerous Sunni triangle. Balad air base is also collocated with the LSA Anaconda Army base that houses more than 10,000 US soldiers. Balad is strictly a military air operation. Although, Balad's threat is higher than Basra's, the bases still provide a good basis for comparison.

C. DA NANG AIR BASE, VIETNAM

The Marine defense of Da Nang AB was not just an attempt to defend an air base. The Marines saw Da Nang AB as key to their part in countering the insurgency. They called it the "ink blot" approach.¹⁷⁴ The Marines started by securing the base and then working outward by clearing areas of VC but never leaving the terrain they cleared. Instead the Marines sought to hold the terrain (and population in the terrain) against any VC counter-action. The Marines designed their defense around these enclaves of local or US security. As it pertained to the Marines, it was a plot of land surrounding vital airstrips.¹⁷⁵ Without air power, South Vietnamese troops would be in a bind for a swift striking capability. Without Marine security around the airstrips, aircraft and helicopters

¹⁷² Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 17.

¹⁷³ Fox, 139-144.

¹⁷⁴ Originally a French counterinsurgency tactic.

¹⁷⁵ Tom Bartlett, *Ambassadors in Green*, (Norfolk, VA: Leatherneck Association, 1971) 23.

were vulnerable to enemy mortar, rocket, and small arms fire. With the airstrip locked in a firm, friendly grasp, allied troops in the field were guaranteed resupply, reinforcements and quick medical evacuation. This plan of action was consistent with the mission of the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF): "to secure advanced air or naval bases...to deny the use of seized positions and areas to the enemy...to close with and destroy the enemy."¹⁷⁶ The Marines took a very strategic perspective in securing Da Nang AB.¹⁷⁷

To best fulfill this mission the Marines incorporated all of the GVN security apparatus in the vicinity of Da Nang under the III MAF Commander in March 1965. Within this area, USAF security police guarded part of the interior of the base with emphasis on the flight line, but worked under the III MAF Commander. The Marine units provided patrols, dedicated a battalion of MPs to help defend the base and assist the Armed Forces Police in training and working with the local police to secure Da Nang City, whose metropolitan area population went from 110,000 in 1960 to nearly 900,000 people in 1970. The Marines also developed the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program to counter the insurgency in the villages and hamlets outside of Da Nang. The Marine MP battalion and Armed Forces Police in Da Nang City were instrumental in training the local police and maintaining law and order in a city that was rapidly developing an industrial capability which, along with Operation ROLLING THUNDER's bombing of the south, brought tens of thousands of rural peasants to the city. The result was a large urban slum. These conditions invited VC influence but the Marines' focus on law and order with the local police force paid dividends in disrupting the VC's to execute military actions.¹⁷⁸ Demonstrated clearly during the Tet Offensive of 1968, Da Nang was far less affected than most other parts of Vietnam, particularly Saigon and Hue, even though it was Vietnam's second largest city. This is not to say that the VC were unable

¹⁷⁶ Bartlett, *Ambassadors*, 12.

¹⁷⁷ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 20.

¹⁷⁸ There is a distinction here between "military actions" and "specific acts of terrorism" such as kidnappings, assassinations, small bombings, etc. In Vietnam, these incidents were tracked separately. The VC/NVA were able to commit acts of terrorism throughout the war; however, the pacification and law and order efforts did have an effect. In 1968, about 7000 acts of terrorism were documented but this number was down to 4,000 by 1971.

to commit terrorist acts or targeted assassinations in Da Nang, because they were. However, the VC were unable to execute military operations seen in other cities.

In the area outside of Da Nang City, the Marines developed their most famous counterinsurgent action from Vietnam, and has been resurrected in Iraq, the CAP team. A CAP team, normally twelve Marines, was assigned to a village or hamlet where the team lived with and trained and led the village militia against the VC or NVA in the area. These CAP units often were able to create excellent intelligence networks in their area to help CAP and Marine patrols engage local VC units. In a short period of time, the VC began to avoid villages with CAP teams. This maneuver allowed Marine patrols to concentrate in areas between villages and increase their chances of contact with VC units.

And although the CAP program has often been criticized for not having lasting effects in the villages they occupied because of a weak civic action operation, no village with CAP was ever lost to the VC.¹⁷⁹ CAP led units also accounted for 7.5 percent of all enemy killed but represented only 1.5 percent of the Marines in Vietnam, and Marines were only about one-third of US forces in Vietnam.¹⁸⁰ CAP units also had a lower percentage of casualties as compared to Army units deployed on “seek and destroy” missions. This is an effect far beyond their numbers and since many CAP teams were within 20km of Da Nang air base, it can be assumed that a large percentage of the VC killed were ultimately intending to attack the air base. However, the CAP program never “surrounded” Da Nang air base but was mostly focused around the air base and along the main supply routes leading in and out of the Da Nang area.¹⁸¹

From 1966-1968, it is impossible to determine the disrupting effects that the CAP teams and Marine patrols had on VC units targeting Da Nang AB or trying to infiltrate and disrupt actions in Da Nang City. To defend Da Nang AB and, simultaneously, counter the insurgency, the Marines took the unconventional approach of not focusing on

¹⁷⁹ Brooks R. Brewington. (1996). *Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement*. Thesis Paper. USMC Command and Staff College; Quantico, VA. p. 21.

¹⁸⁰ Pelli, Frank. (1990). *Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and the Marines in Vietnam*. Thesis Paper. USMC Command and Staff College; Quantico, VA. PP. 13-16; Brewington, pp. 13-19.

¹⁸¹ Thomas Harvey (former US Marine CAP Lieutenant in Vietnam), in discussion with author, on 7 Aug 2005.

securing the base itself but on securing the local area and its population. Several statistics point to the effectiveness of the Marines.

From 1965 thru 1968, Da Nang AB was only the fifth most attacked base even though it was the target of VC and, as the closest main air base to the DMZ, thousands of infiltrating NVA personnel. A 1969 USAF intelligence report described the threat at Da Nang as the highest in Vietnam.¹⁸² During the Tet Offensive, air bases further south, specifically Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut, faced VC attacks of battalions and larger. Da Nang suffered no such attacks and very few stand-off attacks but that was not for lack of trying. Several CAP teams and their militias, just four kilometers from the Da Nang air base, were able to engage and disrupt multiple battalions of VC/NVA whose intended target was the air base.¹⁸³ Only one sapper attack ever made it to the perimeter and it occurred before the advent of the CAP program and before the MP Battalion was assigned to the city in 1965. Da Nang was one of the least mortared bases in Vietnam because it was difficult for an enemy to get within 7km of the base without meeting a CAP-led patrol, a Marine patrol, local police, Marine MPs, or an AFOSI informant.¹⁸⁴ Out to 7km, the Marines were able to counter ground forces, mortars, and even 107mm rockets before they could threaten the base but VC/NVA forces were able to be supplied with 122mm and 140mm rockets by 1967.

With ranges out to 14km, the 122mm and 140mm rockets could not only travel further but also carried a far larger warhead than the 107mm rockets that other bases faced. The rockets were also able to be launched by timer so congregations of enemy forces that could draw attention of friendly forces or the population, were not necessary.

¹⁸² Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 220.

¹⁸³ Timothy Duffy (former US Marine CAP Sergeant), email to author, 25 Apr 2005. Talis Kaminskis (former US Marine CAP Sergeant), email to author, 3 May 2005. Mike Readinger (former US Marine CAP Sergeant), email to author, 23 and 24 Apr 2005. Readinger relayed that he always thought that the CAP program was an unconventional approach to defending Da Nang air base. It must be mentioned that the CAP “Echo teams” that intercepted the VC Regiment during Tet suffered massive casualties and were nearly obliterated in defense of the base. However, the main fight was done by only three CAP teams totaling about 35-40 Marines and about 150 Popular Force allies.

¹⁸⁴ The secure environment created by the Marines’ actions at Da Nang are credited with helping AFOSI establish an effective informant network. SA Forbes said the lack of a secure environment at Balad air base is one of the contributing factors in AFOSI’s inability to establish an effective informant network.

At the greater distances, the VC/NVA was able to take advantage of gaps between CAP operations to execute the rocket attacks.¹⁸⁵ Da Nang AB would be attacked with these rockets nearly 90 times over the course of the war and earn the nickname, “Rocket City.”¹⁸⁶ However, more than 75% of these attacks occurred from 1969-1972, when the Marines were pulled out of Da Nang and ended their unconventional operations. In late 1968, most of the CAP teams were pulled from their villages and changed to mobile operations that proved to be devastating in the Marines ability to maintain their village intelligence nets.¹⁸⁷ By wars end in 1973, Da Nang was Vietnam’s most attacked base even though the internal base defense of Da Nang had remained essentially unchanged from 1965-1968. This suggests that the internal defense actions that the USAF focuses on had a limited impact on the actual defense of the base.¹⁸⁸

D. TUY HOA AIR BASE, VIETNAM

The defense of Tuy Hoa was not an intentional unconventional operation but it turned out much that way. When Tuy Hoa AB was being constructed and upgraded from 1964-1968, the USAF employed a huge number of workers from the local community to work on the base. In order to support the construction and operation of the base, the USAF helped construct villages and housing in the local area and the US Army took over the local rail line and made it run on time.¹⁸⁹ Eventually a community of greater than 16,000 people lived in an area just a few kilometers from Tuy Hoa’s perimeter.¹⁹⁰ The constant interaction between the base and the local community, the dependence of the community on the base’s operation, and the base’s support of law and order resulted in the people in the vicinity of Tuy Hoa becoming extremely resistant to Viet Cong

¹⁸⁵ Thomas Harvey (former US Marine CAP Lieutenant in Vietnam), in discussion with author, on 7 Aug 2005.

¹⁸⁶ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 172-206; Vick, *Snakes*, 128-153.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. Kaminskis and Readinger both called the change to “mobile” CAP teams beginning in late 1968 as the “worst decision of the war” because the CAP teams lost influence over the intelligence networks they established.

¹⁸⁸ It should be noted that though USAF’s actions were incongruent when facing an enemy like the VC but still proved effective against a saboteur. Although being in a country where very few SP’s spoke the language and air bases required thousands of host nation workers, the VC was only able to execute three successful saboteur attacks.

¹⁸⁹ Fox, 60-67.

¹⁹⁰ Vick, 98.

influence. However, this accidental “hearts and minds” campaign was only possible because of the presence of the 25th Regiment of the Korean White Horse Division.

The 25th Regiment had the singular mission of protecting the population in the vicinity of Tuy Hoa from the insurgents. Although the Koreans were not considered successful in developing local Vietnamese security capability, the Koreans were superb at using local intelligence to combat and eventually deter VC/NVA forces.¹⁹¹

Without VC influence, the positive impact the USAF had on the community was able to take hold among the locals. Also contributing was that the population near Tuy Hoa air base had very little interaction with offensive Air Force or Army operations that made other regions of Vietnam more susceptible to the VC. Although located in a very high threat area, Tuy Hoa AB was attacked only three times from 1965-1972, the lowest for any base in Vietnam.¹⁹² It is doubtful, though, that the USAF’s internally focused defense contributed to Tuy Hoa’s success.

In fact, in 1967, a 7AF security inspection at Tuy Hoa described the security as “poor” and Tuy Hoa AB as having the worst security of any base in Vietnam.¹⁹³ However, the report only examined the physical characteristics of security: fighting positions, checkpoints, barriers, fence lines, and aircraft revetments. It did not consider the influence the base had over the community and how that relationship effectively disrupted the insurgent enemy. The Air Force needed the population to construct and maintain Tuy Hoa air base and its air operation. Coupled with the actions of the Korean 25th Regiment, the defense of Tuy Hoa was unconventional in nature – and thereby successful.

E. BASRA AIR BASE, IRAQ

It has appeared that from the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency that the US Army seemed unable to crack the insurgency, and certainly this article has not argued

¹⁹¹ James L. Collins and Stanley Larsen. (1985). *Allied Participation in Vietnam*. (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1985) 147-169. Donald Graham (former USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant), email with author, 13 Apr 2005.

¹⁹² Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 172-206; Vick, *Snakes*, 128-153.

¹⁹³ Fox, 60-67.

otherwise, but the British defense of Basra is the exception to that rule. The RAF defenders of Basra are responsible for securing the air base's ground defense area of over 220 sq km that includes the base and stretches out to 7km in most directions.¹⁹⁴

Within the ground defense area, the RAF Regiment immediately initiated a base defense operation focused on counterinsurgency and the achievement of local security. This is not to say that this was obvious at the opening of the base in May 2003. The RAF Regiment freely admits that they do not have doctrine that directs how they operate but instead they are encouraged to develop strategy based on the air base defense situation.¹⁹⁵ Two key factors come out of this approach.

First, the RAF Regiment believes that the most important task is to attain situational awareness.¹⁹⁶ They have even modeled different base defense scenarios and determined that seeking situational awareness is the only correct path. The second is that since the RAF Regiment develops a new strategy for each air base, it makes it difficult for them to make a strategic first move against an insurgent. Though a slight weakness, the RAF Regiment makes up for it with follow through. For example, it took the RAF Regiment nearly ten months to gain a clear insight into how they wanted to defend Basra but by March 2004, they had developed a comprehensive strategy. The RAF Regiment plan not only accounted for the saboteur threat on-base but continuous patrolling of their ground defense area, training and supervising the Iraqi Border Guards, liaison with the Iraqi Army and a local pseudo-militia, complete a partial census of their area, and implement a civic action program that relocated an entire village to an area where the village may prosper.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ John Hall (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005.

¹⁹⁵ Scott Millington (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), Neal Rawlsthorne (Royal Air Force (RAF) Squadron Leader), and Thomas Miner (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005.

¹⁹⁶ John Hall (Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment Wing Commander), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005.

¹⁹⁷ David Blackman (Royal Air Force (RAF) Warrant Officer), in discussion with author at RAF Strike Command and RAF Honington, UK, 7-9 Mar 2005.

The RAF Regiment had to work by, with, and thru others (other RAF, Border Guards, etc.) because their force is only slightly larger than the USAF security forces unit at Balad whose task is only to secure part of a flightline that is already internal to the base. By training, supervising, and liaison with the Iraqi forces, the RAF Regiment has had the ability to vet those who are untrustworthy and observe local leaders who may be trying to work both for the state and the insurgents. Basra may not have the comparable threat of a Balad or Baghdad, the fact is the air base resides outside Iraq's second largest city just kilometers from the Iranian border and has not been attacked since October 2004.

F. BALAD AIR BASE (LSA ANACONDA), IRAQ

As mentioned previously, Balad is a base defense operation that, at least up until April 2005, has been ineffective in interdicting the threat of the insurgents in the area. Also mentioned were the separate chains of command for the Army, USAF, AFOSI, and Iraqi elements. If fact, the USAF SP unit at Balad is nearly as large as the RAF force at Basra even though the SP's only guard the flight line (more of that internal focus). It is no surprise then that Balad has been the most attacked base in Iraq since the end of combat operations in 2003. The attacks have all been standoff rocket and mortar attacks as well as nearby vehicle ambushes, improvised explosive devices, kidnappings, and carjackings of base personnel and contractors.

In response to the attacks in early 2004, the Army implemented an aggressive plan to counter the rocket and mortar attacks that was based around letting the insurgent attack the base and then counterattack with decisive force.¹⁹⁸ The plan had one fatal flaw: without the presence in the community and the cooperation of the public the Army could not use their decisive force. Counter-battery fire and helicopter response forces were usually useless because the enemy realized that if they fired from a populated location or fire the weapons using a timer, the delay in response would allow them to slip

¹⁹⁸ Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), Rodney Holland (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Joseph Lawson (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant), and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

away among the population.¹⁹⁹ The population was certainly not for the insurgents but wasn't against them either. The population around Balad validated T.E. Lawrence's observation for the insurgent's to succeed, "all we need is 2% active supporters and 98% neutral sympathizers".²⁰⁰

If anything this focus on direct action only encouraged the use of force when it was not necessary, such as the aforementioned orchard fire, due to a mixture of long deployments, fear of casualties, risk aversion, and frustration. The result was that just five months after the initiation of the direct action plan, attacks against Balad peaked. In response the wing commander asked CENTAF for help on trying to stop the "rocket man".²⁰¹ Task Force (TF) 1041 was CENTAF's answer. TF1041 consisted of approximately 200 security forces personnel, mostly from the 820th Force Protection Group (FPG), Moody AFB, Georgia.

TF1041 was put together in November 2004 with the mission to kill/capture all insurgents in the most contentious area near the base.²⁰² A 100 sq km area of about six Sunni villages north-north west of Balad – a direct action mission that was essentially the same as the Army's had been prior to the task force's arrival.²⁰³ The mission had an initiation date of 1 January 2005 for a duration of 60 days. The mission was clear and precise with the Balad's wing commander ensuring the leadership of TF1041 also understood that he requested the task force to stop the rockets and the car-jackings and kidnapping – seemingly requiring a counterinsurgency focus.²⁰⁴ How did the team reconcile the issue of direct action and counterinsurgency? The task force commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Bargery, ensured the integration of both of these mission

¹⁹⁹ Eric Pohland (USAF Security Forces Colonel) and Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.

²⁰⁰ T.E. Lawrence, T.E. "Evolution of a Revolt," *Army Quarterly*, (October, 1920), 119.

²⁰¹ Eric Pohland (USAF Security Forces Colonel) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Brad Scott (USAF Intelligence Senior Master Sergeant), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.

²⁰⁴ Eric Pohland (USAF Security Forces Colonel) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.

requirements when he restated TF1041's mission, "This is a war against insurgents, and the battlefield is asymmetric. We can't stay inside the fence and hope the bad guys go away. Hope isn't effective in preventing attacks, so we go out and take action...the local people are afraid. The terrorists operate (among) them, and we have to win the confidence of the local people. If you demonstrate you are a fair and effective alternative to the terrorists, you can sometimes earn the people's support and build lasting relationships."²⁰⁵ TF1041 had an initial "hit list" but they understood that if they wanted that list to grow they had to secure the population. Four guiding principles were established aimed at reducing the fear of the insurgent among the public: precision, accuracy, deliberateness, forcefulness.²⁰⁶

The initial reaction of the Army was mostly one of ambivalence and detachment but quickly the support of the Army became integral to TF1041's mission – especially with helicopter support.²⁰⁷ However, the difference between TF1041's operation and that of the Army they replaced became apparent quickly, even to the public. Although nearly all patrols had a mounted element, most of the time the TF1041s operated as walking patrols. This allowed the patrol to be able to move without observation of the public, if so desired, as well as maximize interaction with the public to gather information and establish presence. TF1041 had 24/7 presence in their AOR with walking patrols. This type of strategy played to the strengths of the unit's members. As one squad leader put it, "we are all trained cops and we work best with the population".²⁰⁸ And as the RAF Regiment had deemed critical, the walking patrols allowed TF1041 to achieve a level of situational awareness that the mounted Army patrols could not.

With their police experience, TF1041 had a unique mentality that showed to be different from the Army approaches – civilian considerations, military working dogs, and

²⁰⁵ Colleen Wronek, "Airmen Track Terrorists Off-base," *332d Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs*, (March 2005). Contents of Lt Col Bargery's quote confirmed by Major Christensen.

²⁰⁶ Armand Lyons (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

²⁰⁷ Kyle Hurwitz (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.

²⁰⁸ Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

females. Security forces never operate, homestation or deployed, without considerations for civilians. Air bases are inherently occupied and surrounded with civilians so this factor is always a consideration for security forces and their heavy weapons units. The working dogs provided not only an element of respectability anytime that were in contact with the public but they also acted as a mobile explosives detector. Working dogs found several weapon caches and an IED during TF1041 and undoubtedly this was a significant psychological advantage.²⁰⁹ The advantage of women in combat may not be clearly evident but police research indicates that female officers often communicate better with women and children and Iraq was no different. Two squad leaders interviewed credited the female team members with gathering far superior information from Iraqi women and children and provided enhanced force protection for the patrol because they could search women.²¹⁰ This ensured security and local customs were respected.

Only lasting for a 60 day period means analyzing measures of effectiveness is anecdotal but some details stand out. Air base attacks dropped significantly lower than the previous 60 days and lower than the same time during the previous year. Moreover, TF1041 made 98 “high value target” arrests.²¹¹ Maybe a more telling statistic is that more than 50% of the registered Sunni voters in the TF1041 area, voted – about four to five times the rate of other Sunni areas within the Sunni triangle in Iraq.²¹² According to data and surveys collected by iraqanalysis.org, less than 40% of Iraqi’s country-wide

²⁰⁹ Kyle Hurwitz (USAF Security Forces Captain), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005. The experience of TF1041 helped initiate the Special Search Dog program at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. This new program allows working dogs to work off-leash at a significant distance from the handler. This allows a more robust search capability while better protecting the handler and other security personnel.

²¹⁰ Derek Privette (USAF Security Forces Master Sergeant) and Paul Schaaf (USAF Security Forces Technical Sergeant) in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA on 17-19 May 2005.

²¹¹ Brad Scott (USAF Intelligence Senior Master Sergeant), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.

²¹² Glen Christensen (USAF Security Forces Major), in discussion with author at 820th Force Protection Group, Moody Air Force Base, GA, 17-19 May 2005.; Just as importantly, the International Herald Tribune reported on 7 Jan 2005 that the region that Basra was located was “too unsafe for voting”. This makes the accomplishments of TF1041 look near remarkable. Retrieved on 31 Jul 2005 from <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/06/news/iraq.html>.

voted in the January elections with the primary reason being for not voting was security fears.²¹³ This speaks to TF1041's ability to secure the population.

On their final patrol, Major Glen Christensen, TF1041 operations officer, relayed an incident telling of the difference in how the task force operated and the US Army units they had replaced: "There were some kids and teenagers we went over to talk to and as we were talking an US Army patrol drove up. The kids began to point and through our interpreter we found out they were calling the Army the 'enemy'. So I said 'no, they are not the enemy, they are friends like us'. The response was 'no, you are police, they are the enemy'".²¹⁴

G. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES USING THE NEW PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE

All of the cases studied had times of effective operation; however, some differences emerged.

Act First. Of the case studies, Tuy Hoa and Basra nearly achieved the principle of Act First and as such both were the least attacked of the bases studied. As discussed earlier, the same long-lasting deterrent effect of Act First was observed at Bashur and Tallil in Iraq as well. Da Nang and Balad did not Act First but both acted as early as possible and this certainly helped the base defense outcome at each location.²¹⁵

Unity of Effort. Tuy Hoa and Balad did not achieve a unity of effort although Tuy Hoa was probably more unified than Balad simply because of the off-base actions of the 25th Regiment of the Korean White Horse Division. TF1041, Da Nang, and Basra were able to execute unified small unit action and able to interact with the public in an effective manner. Da Nang and Basra did have unity of effort with Da Nang going a step further and actually creating a situation that is better described as unity of command. The only failure in this category at Da Nang was the Marines lack of effort to develop local political leaders to continue the counterinsurgency fight after the departure of the static CAP operations. This ensured the unity of effort would not persevere. Each base looked

²¹³ Retrieved on 2 Aug 05 from <http://www.iraqanalysis.org/info/55>.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Balad in this reference is referring to TF1041.

at depended on indigenous or allied forces to do much of the “heavy lifting” in the effort to protect the population and secure the local area with Da Nang, Tuy Hoa, and Basra as the most prominent examples of the use of indigenous and allied forces off-base, and Balad to a much smaller extent.

Protection. All four bases can probably credit any measure of success to the level of protection accorded their local populations. Da Nang, through the CAP, MP battalion, and other patrolling efforts established good presence throughout most of their AOR focused on Protecting the population and the air base. Da Nang defending forces also demonstrated some willingness to intervene on behalf of the population although CAP units normally did limited law and order missions. The Marines operated with restraint but were able to apply deliberate force in a very effective manner against VC units. The only Achilles’ heel was the low level of civic action. The VC was an extremely organized and politically focused insurgent group in the area of Da Nang and, even though the Marines isolated the insurgents from the population, without effective civic action the VC was able to maintain their influence.²¹⁶ As far as force protection, the Marines and USAF forces established an extensive operation that included dynamic and passive measures. In fact, Da Nang was considered to have Vietnam’s most far-reaching passive defense measures to include a mass network of hardened structures and sensor systems.²¹⁷ Da Nang’s protection of the public and the base were the focus of the Marines operations but still only achieved mixed results for three reasons: 1) the strength and resilience of the VC/NVA in the Da Nang area, 2) the decision to abandon the static CAP operations and implement mobile operations, and 3) the Marines’ level of civic action essentially stopped at training the local Popular Forces (PF) because the focus was

²¹⁶ Thomas Harvey (former US Marine CAP Lieutenant in Vietnam), in discussion with author, on 7 Aug 2005. Lt Harvey said when he returned to Vietnam in the 1990’s he discovered that many of his Vietnamese friends were VC sympathizers who actively supported the VC with supplies. He was shocked by this because the family that he stayed with for nearly a year and a half were one of the VC leaders in the village. These people, however, never ambushed any of the Marines in the village and even assisted on some ambushes of other VC units. When asked why they did not attack the Marines or reject the VC, the response to Lt Harvey was that they did not attack the Marines because they found them supportive of the village and did not want to encourage a larger American response. As to why they did not reject the VC politically, the former village leaders told Lt Harvey that simply there was no other political option. Of note, Lt Harvey was part a mobile CAP program that headquartered out of the village discussed in the communication with the author.

²¹⁷ Fox, *Air Base Defense in Vietnam*, 123-133.

on killing VC/NVA instead of defeating them. Although the PF were an exceptional force multiplier, it was hit-or-miss whether the PF were trained to operate without the Marines and there was little emphasis from the Marines to assist (or evaluate) local political leaders in more effectively managing their villages or the local PF.

The effective Protection of Tuy Hoa was predicated on three factors: 1) the presence and interaction of the defense forces (Korean and USAF) with the population coupled with the ability to apply deliberate force, 2) the population was never disrupted by conventional Army operations, and 3) the VC never established a high-level of action in the Tuy Hoa area probably because of the Act First strategy employed. As far as the other elements of Protection, the defenders of Tuy Hoa never showed a great willingness to intervene, the Koreans were not known for using restraint or civic action and the passive force protection measures at Tuy Hoa was considered the weakest in Vietnam.

The defenders of Basra showed a thorough application of the principle of Protection. The RAF Regiment showed presence, conflict resolution, restraint, deliberate force, a high level of civic action and acceptable force protection. Only “acceptable” force protection because the Regiment normally operates without any body armor because they feel situational awareness is their shield. And so far, they have been right. The only shortfall of the Regiment (and British in general) at Basra has been combating organized crime in the area that has grown enough to possibly present a future insurgent threat.

Balad is a tale of two operations. Pre-TF1041, the principle of Protection was wholly not met at Balad, yet excellent passive force protection measures have prevented significant damage as a result of the insurgent standoff attacks. TF1041, on the other hand, operated with interactive presence, some willingness to intervene, restrained in the use of force but deliberate and powerful when required, and excellent force protection. Only a lack of civic action presents a shortfall in TF1041’s operation and a possible limitation in the long-term effectiveness of TF1041’s mission if it was allowed to operate beyond 60 days. Further, by not working with the local forces and political entities, TF1041 required a larger dedication of US force.

Penetration. Da Nang defenders were able to establish some effective intelligence networks (especially with the static CAP operations) among the population in the local villages and in the city Da Nang but mostly failed to gather intelligence on local friendly forces or penetrate the VC. This limited the long-term impact of Marines in stopping the insurgency. The Koreans at Tuy Hoa were able to penetrate the local population very effectively and also managed to penetrate some VC units. As far as penetrating local friendly forces, neither the Koreans nor the US tried to penetrate each other and yet trusted each other because of the previous experience of the Korean War. The RAF Regiment at Basra has effectively penetrated the local population and the friendly forces in the vicinity of the base but has not yet penetrated the insurgency. Balad, prior to TF1041, achieved very little penetration of the community, friendly forces, and the insurgency but were still able to Balad to create a list of possible insurgents that resulted in 98 arrests and 18 people detained. However, it was not until TF1041 was created that these arrests were able to be made. This is because TF1041 was able to penetrate the local population but did not penetrate Iraqi friendly forces or the insurgency.

Perseverance. Da Nang was a base that operated from 1965 to 1973 so it would be difficult to say that the defenders did not show perseverance but this study believes they did not. The best example of this is the change from static to mobile CAP teams in 1968 and the rapid drawdown of Marine forces beginning in 1970. Both actions showed to the public that the US was not trying to win and this was only exasperated by the lack of civic action to train forces and politicians to continue an effective defense after the departure of Marines. Tuy Hoa was able to maintain perseverance as has Basra and Balad in Iraq. Sadly, Balad is not troubled by level of dedication, only a poor strategy. TF1041, being only 60 days, did not demonstrate perseverance which is why the gains were only temporary.

Overall, the New Principles of Air Base Defense prove to be a synergistic solution. The facets of Protection and Penetration are the base of the defense operation because they represent the tactics, techniques, and procedures that must be implemented. Acting First provides quick opportunities to achieve the principles of Protection and

Penetration. In fact, the “Act” in Acting First means to implement to principles of Protection and Penetration first. Unity of Effort makes the Protection and Penetration principles more effectively and more efficiently achieved. Unity of Effort is also critical in the principle of Perseverance where an engaged and effective indigenous force will become a long-term counterinsurgent presence and allow the US to implement a low-cost defense strategy. Perseverance is critical to Protection and Penetration because it demonstrates the physical and moral sacrifice the US is willing to make in the security effort. As such, it extenuates every tactic used by US forces because the public interprets not just as some short-term solution but a long-term effort. This will impact the public’s preferences on who to support in the counterinsurgent struggle.

This study considers success as one where the defense is able to disrupt and deter enemy attacks while also limiting the damage of the enemy attack. The New Principles appear to be predictive and descriptive of a successful air base defense effort. Although, Da Nang, from 1965 to 1968, and TF1041 appear to possible exceptions but each were able to achieve Protection and Penetration which are the staples of the defense.

Da Nang and TF1041 had some special circumstances. Da Nang faced an extremely powerful and determined opponent in the VC that was already well-developed before the Marines arrived in Vietnam in 1965. Even so, the Marines showed success. TF1041’s circumstance is that of time – TF1041 was limited to a 60-day event that focused on “capture/kill” operations. This does make it difficult to extrapolate long-term success but even the short-term impacts are predicted by the New Principles.

Air Base	New Principles of Air Base Defense					
	Act First ²¹⁸	Unity of Effort ²¹⁹	Protection	Penetration	Perseverance	<u>Successful?</u>
Da Nang '65-'68	No	Yes	Yes	Somewhat	No	Somewhat
Da Nang '68'-73	No	Somewhat	Somewhat	No	No	No
Tuy Hoa	Yes	No	Yes	Somewhat	Yes	Yes
Basra	Yes	Yes	Yes	Somewhat	Yes	Yes
Balad	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Balad (TF1041 only)	No	Somewhat	Yes	Somewhat	No	Yes

Figure 5. Application of the New Principles of Air Base Defense.

²¹⁸ Although Da Nang and TF1041 did not act first, both acted effectively as early as possible.

²¹⁹ TF1041 had a unity of effort between US Army and USAF forces but lacked that unity of effort with Iraqi forces.

VII. CONCLUSION

In the mid-1990's Project AIR FORCE, a division of the RAND Corporation, assessed that in the foreseeable future no conventional opponent could challenge US air assets – in the air.²²⁰ As such, RAND predicted that adversaries will find alternative methods to challenging US airpower. However, RAND's study failed to articulate that this was not a new development because the insurgent has been the primary threat to US airpower for the last 50 years. Yet the insurgent has not targeted air bases with decisive force but instead attacks in whatever method is left available in order to disrupt US air operation but, more importantly, to attack the US center of gravity – the political will of the US public – while protecting the insurgent's center of gravity – the local population. The insurgent air base attack, therefore, is more so a form of information warfare in which every attack is a message to attack and defend the US and the insurgent center's of gravity, respectively.

The US does not view the attacks as informational in nature but instead attacks to achieve a tactical objective: harassment. The US believes the insurgent values the same thing as the US military does, its military resources. The insurgent, in this view, seeks to maximize the physical damage to US airpower in order to somehow defeat US airpower. And if physical damage is the goal of the insurgent, then the US military, and the Air Force in particular, assumes the insurgent will want to attack the resources through a ground assault or a saboteur because at close range the insurgent has a much higher percentage of success in destroying US resources. The Air Force than applies an engineered solution to the base defense that counters the enemy's ground maneuvers and insider threat with fields of fire, large response forces, massed technology, hierarchical command structure, barriers, fences, checkpoints, facility hardening, and identification systems. Even though this wrongly views the insurgency as a conventional force, at a limited level this approach has some merit but it ignores the goal and system of the insurgent.

²²⁰ Hettingja, *Tan Son Nhut*, p. 1.

The insurgent system is a plan of organizational growth based on how the insurgents “interact” with the population. The interaction is based on manipulation of information to exert control over the population. The manipulation of information is possible because the insurgents strive to either isolate the population from other sources of information or to demonstrate to the population that the insurgent’s information is more important. The manipulation is achieved through acts of symbolic violence, intimidation or replacement of local leaders, public statements, and attacking the force that opposes them (i.e., police, army, outside agencies, etc.). Surely, if the US is a supporter of the state or the antagonist in a transnational insurgency than air base attacks will be prominent in the plan of the insurgents. The goal is that the population will process this information and, as a result, behave in a manner that is advantageous to the insurgent. Whether that behavior is as an active fighter, silently neutral (which is most of the population), or as a supplier of resources, as long as it is the behavior the insurgents require and expect, than the population will ensure its own safety. Of course, the behavior desired of the US population is to call for the end of US involvement. This is a political victory for the insurgent.

Since political victory, or some political conciliation, is the goal of the insurgent, the insurgent does not fight by conventional methods but exemplifies acts of terror and hit-and-run guerrilla tactics instead. Fighting the insurgent is not conducive to the engineered solution but requires human knowledge and interaction to be successful. This approach is not found in air base defense doctrine but in the theories of counterinsurgency of Gordon McCormick and Julian Paget. With a counterinsurgent approach, the defense of the base from the insurgent becomes a symmetric conflict where both the insurgent and counterinsurgent struggle for the control of the population and the information. This is security based not solely on sandbags, barriers, and fields of fire that only allows a base to more effectively absorb enemy punishment but security that prevents enemy attacks, deters enemy action, and strikes the enemy first.

In order to achieve this type of security, New Principles of Air Base Defense were developed from McCormick’s and Paget’s theories of counterinsurgency: 1) Act First, 2) Unity of Effort, 3) Protection, 4) Penetration, and 5) Perseverance.

Act First is unique in that it is a principle of timing. The method for implementing the principle of “Act First” is the employment of counter-insurgent air base defense tactics before or no later than the arrival of US aircraft. This can be achieved in one of two ways: 1) operational preparation of the environment (OPE) or 2) advanced force operations. The implication is that the USAF must find and develop qualified personnel to execute Advanced Force, Training and Advising, or Operational Preparation of the Environment missions with indigenous forces in order to Act First.

Unity of Effort is a principle of organizational imperative and objective. Without unified action, the insurgents will find and expose fractures in the base defense. The US must influence allied and indigenous defense force and local political authorities to view the execution of the base defense mission the same way and strive for the same short and long-term objectives. The objectives not only must be the same but the method for achieving the objectives must be identical, or near to it. Critical to ensuring this unity of effort is the unity of command among external elements (such as US and allies) and the integration of intelligence operations of all defense forces. If AFOSI hides intelligence from the security forces, if the US hides intelligence from allies, or if indigenous forces hide intelligence from US forces, the defense will suffer. Implications are considerable: 1) air base commanders must become intimately involved in the base defense and in influencing indigenous forces and local political leaders and 2) AFOSI must be placed under the same chain of command as USAF security forces in order unify all base defense operations.

Along with Penetration, Protection is a principle of strategy. Protecting the population and isolating the insurgent are key components to Paget’s and McCormick’s models for counter-insurgency and are also key in the defense of the base. However, in terms of air base defense, “protection” takes on an even broader definition. Not only must the defense forces protect the population, as in McCormick’s model, but also protect the base and US personnel as well. The base and the US personnel represent a direct link to US COG – US public opinion. And the local population is the COG of the insurgent. The US must protect its own COG while isolating the insurgent from its COG. This is achieved through presence, train/advise indigenous forces, intervention and

conflict resolution, restraint, deliberate force, civic action, and force protection. Implications of the principle of Protection include: 1) air base defense operations must focus off-base to counter the insurgent; 2) the encouragement of Air Force security forces to utilize their experience as police officers operating in small teams; 4) air bases must accept the duties of training, assisting, and advising indigenous forces as well as assisting or advising in local civic action; and 4) Air Force security forces must also train to execute deliberate force actions in units larger than squad-size. The Air Force base defense forces already have the right foundation because they can act like a cop while thinking like a cop but can also act like an infantryman while still thinking like a cop. This policeman's attitude allows the defense force to see and interdict problems in the community, apply practical solutions, seek out dealings with the population, and not be frustrated by the restraints of Rules of Engagement that are almost never more restrictive than the Rules of Engagement police deal with on duty in the U.S. This type of mental flexibility accentuates both knowledge and action.

The fourth principle of air base defense is Penetration. Penetration is the other principle of strategy and is linked with Protection. By establishing Protection of the population that breaks the insurgent's link with the population, Penetration efforts use that security groundwork to achieve a level of situational awareness and intelligence equal to that of the insurgent. Penetration is intelligence-gathering, investigation, evaluation of other friendly forces, and evaluation of the success of the base defense effort. Penetration is not just the penetration of the insurgency, though certainly the ultimate goal, but also is penetration of the population, friendly forces, and local political officials. Implications of Penetration are not significant since the security forces already have the skills and attitude to effectively interact with a population to gather information and AFOSI has some extensive experience in overt intelligence collection; however, these forces must be unified in order maximize and synergize the intelligence-gathering effort.

The fifth and final principle of air base defense is Perseverance. Perseverance is a principle of timing and effort and is synonymous with will. It provides another moral component to the base defense mission. Perseverance means that the state will not be

outlasted or out-willed. Perseverance in this way means that once the insurgent's operating space is attacked than that level of effort is maintained in order to not allow the insurgency maneuver to adjust and grow. The reason for this is that both counterinsurgencies and air bases tend to be long-term commitments for the US. Implications for Perseverance are similar to Acting First and Protection because Perseverance requires the USAF to accept the mission of OPE and civic action in order to ensure the long-term security of the air base beyond the need for US use.

The New Principles of Air Base Defense provide a starting point in planning and executing a base defense that protects the friendly forces' freedom of action in the air base's physical, informational, and moral realm and denies these realms from the insurgent. In doing so, base defense forces can prevent base attacks that the current doctrine simply cannot do.

Preventing an attack has a particular relevance for OOTW air base operations similar to those during Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwandan operations where the USAF often operates separate from other US forces. In this environment, a single significant air base attack could destroy the American public's resolve for the operation or push the US to greater involvement, as in the case of Bien Hoa in 1964.

Moreover, in implementing an air base defense plan based on counterinsurgency theories, the air base can now contribute to a strategic stabilization effort for a combatant commander beyond just providing airpower but by also ensuring an area hostile to an insurgency. The base can establish and maintain a secure area that Army and Marine units can expand in order to deny sanctuary to an insurgency. In light of the results of air base defense in Iraq to date, there appears to be no other option.

A. TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Implementing the New Principles of Air Base Defense and viewing air base defense as a counterinsurgent struggle, generates several topics that require further study:

1. What training, composition, and organization of Air Force security forces teams would best support the Operational Preparation of the Environment, Advanced Force Operations, and training/advising/liaison missions?
2. What training, skills, and organizational adjustments for security forces and AFOSI would be required to implement the principles of Protection and

Penetration? Would it require a change in the composition of a security forces squad? Should it require the homogenous deployment of security forces as opposed to deploying as separate squads? Would it require more AFOSI agents to complete advanced HUMINT training? Would more Anti-terrorism Teams (ATT) and Force Protection Groups be the main avenue for providing manpower? How to maximize security forces police experience and training while simultaneously maintaining a high proficiency in weapons and infantry skills?

3. How to restructure and integrate the base defense and air operations command and control relationships to emphasize rapid response and the decentralization of control and execution? Can ‘control’ be decentralized in an air base environment?
4. What designs, systems, and applications for technology in a base defense effort can assist in or perform internal security measures in order to free forces for proactive operations? What technologies can be used to support off-base operations and promote initiative at the lowest level of the base defense organization? What system designs can promote the decentralized execution of the base defense operation? Can the low-level operator be the annunciating point for the base defense detection and observation systems instead of the BDOC?
5. In the absence of Army Civil Affairs, what Air Force organization should be the lead agency in expeditionary civic action? What units would contribute to Civil-Military operation and how would they contribute? How would this organization be integrated with the operations of the security forces and AFOSI?
6. How to most effectively train, organize, and implement plans to maximize the number of airmen available for air base defense? As opposed to the Army and Marines, by and large in the Air Force, only the security forces and AFOSI are utilized to defend the base while all other airmen only perform their primary mission whether that is maintenance, services, or civil engineering. These personnel could takeover much of the internal base security measures and relieve security forces to execute more proactive aspects of the defense.
7. How can military working dogs be best utilized in a counterinsurgency? What capabilities are most critical? What level of skill is required? What changes to training would have to be implemented?

APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY

AB – Air Base

ABD – Air Base Defense

AFB – Air Force Base

AFI – Air Force Instruction

AFOSI – Air Force Office of Special Investigation

AFR – Air Force Regulation

AOC – Air Operations Center

ATT – Anti-Terrorism Teams

BDOC – Base Defense Operations Center

C2 – Command and Control

CENTAF – Central Command, Air Force Component

CI – Counter-intelligence

COG – Center of Gravity

CONUS – Continental United States

DFT – Deployment for Training

FEAF – Far East Air Forces

GVN – Government of South Vietnam

HMMWV – Highly Mobile Multi-Wheeled Vehicle

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

JCET – Joint-Combined Exercise Training

KIA – Killed in Action

MACV – Military Advisory Command, Vietnam

MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War

MRF – Mobile Response Force

MWD – Military Working Dog

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NVA – North Vietnamese Army

OOTW – Operations Other Than War

OPE – Operational Preparation of the Environment

PSYOPS – Psychological Operations

RAF – Royal Air Force

ROE – Rules of Engagement

SAS – Special Air Service

TAOR – Tactical Area of Responsibility

TCF – Tactical Combat Force

TF – Task Force

UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

USA – United States Army

USAAF – United States Army Air Force

USAF – United States Air Force

USMC – United States Marine Corps

VC – Viet Cong

WIA – Wounded in Action

WWI – World War I

WWII – World War II

APPENDIX B. PAGET'S MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

Paget argued that battling an insurgency is essentially a fight for intelligence and situational awareness. This is very similar to McCormick's preferred Strategy A which espouses to isolate and expose the insurgent to the power of the state (disrupting their system of growth). Paget developed six principles in using intelligence to defeat an insurgency.

Paget's Principles	Description
1. Establish effective intelligence operations to detect an insurgency before the insurgency has chance to act.	This would be synonymous with trying to find an insurgency before it has even committed an act of symbolic violence. It is possible this could be seen as an almost authoritarian penetration of a society but seeking out an insurgency prior to its development in this manner is very similar to the FBI's penetration of many white supremacist groups in the US that have yet to commit any violent acts. This does make sense in air base defense because air base operations are virtually impossible to keep hidden. Therefore, it should be assumed that if an air operation is going to be established for a period of time (and should in all cases except possibly humanitarian assistance), it will attract local insurgents or international terrorists who are a part of a transnational insurgency. Either way, eliminates the initial political space that an insurgency needs to establish its core. This action dissuades insurgent action or makes it difficult to attack the base and challenge the US mission in the information war. This is the “penetrate first” strategy.
2. Gain knowledge of the enemy before the insurgency becomes a problem.	Similar to the first principle, this principle dictates initiating counterinsurgency operations at the first sign of symbolic violence. Although not referenced in Paget's study, the first two principles basically require the state to act early or, in the case of the first principle, to act first. This is essentially the same concept as making a strategic first move in economic game theory. McCormick and Owen used economic game theory to analyze the importance of the state making a strategic first move against an insurgent. In most cases, making a strategic first move against a budding insurgency will be decisive because the insurgency would

	<p>probably not have had time to develop a foundation among the population. The insurgency will most likely respond by going underground where the inactivity will begin to destroy the group identity. In the case of Khobar Towers for instance, this would have amounted to more aggressive security measures to be implemented in response to the attack at the Saudi Arabian National Guard six months prior to the bombing of Khobar. A conclusion drawn from this principle is that when an air base defense force moves into an air base with an insurgent or terrorist threat, it should implement off-base unconventional operations (i.e., counterinsurgency) in the local area as a first move because this brings the fight to where the insurgent is developing. The internally-focused conventional defense operation, effective against the saboteur, is the proper second move. This is an exact reversal of current USAF doctrine and training. Acting on this principle also dissuades insurgent action or makes it difficult to attack the base and challenge the US mission in the information war.</p>
3. Fully integrated aspects of intelligence and operations under a single commander	<p>A principle of organization. The clearest example of this is the military-civil-police integrated operation that the British implemented successfully in Malaya. In the present, the US will normally not be the military <i>and</i> civilian authority but this does not negate the responsibility for the US to establish a single air base defense operation under a single commander that integrates fully with the local civil and police authorities. As part of this principle, the air base commander should accept Civil-Military Operations responsibility for the area around the air base. The British operate in such a manner and is a major reason for their success in Basra (as a later case study will attest). This is a significant problem for the USAF not only because the USAF responsibility stops at the fenceline and Army and USAF forces have separate chains of command so integration is haphazard but the separation of AFOSI within the Air Force coordinated defense operations through a single commander impossible. The British solve this problem by placing all defensive and Survive-to-Operate forces within the Ground Defense Area under the command of the RAF Force Protection Wing commander who reports directly to the wing commander. AFOSI is certainly a potential asset to the defense but its separation from the overt intelligence and information that security forces are gathering and the security forces separation from AFOSI's information and intelligence ensures neither has clear situational awareness. Effective counterinsurgency is impossible without informed decisions, unified objectives, unified effort, and, if possible, unified command.</p>
4. Identify the gathering of	<p>This principle only reinforces the organizational mistake of AFOSI's separation from the security forces. However, the</p>

intelligence as the top priority of the organization	<p>doctrinal strategy of the Army's conventional mindset is focused mainly on intelligence that supports decisive action – a waste of effort in a counterinsurgency. The USAF's internal view is even worse because it is standards-based and requires no intelligence support at all. Neither understands that every community around an air base is its own microclimate and every local counterinsurgency will be different based on that microclimate. Only intelligence and local knowledge can bridge the often large gap from doctrinal to strategy execution. Again, achieving an advantage in situational awareness will allow defense forces to interdict or minimize insurgent attacks in the informational realm.</p>
5. Gain and maintain cooperation of the populace	<p>This is a “hearts and minds” approach but Paget presents it as a more limited, realistic model. The population does not have to innately ‘prefer’ the state but must, at least, cooperate and support the state and not the insurgent. Key to this is security and civic action. Civic action, to Paget, is not number of wells dug or supplies handed out (though this can help) but training civic administrators to do their jobs effectively and with the knowledge that they serve the public. The public must then be convinced that the civic administrators exist to serve them. This is also part of McCormick’s Strategy A. This principle is essential in winning the information war in the local area of the air base, achieving legitimacy in the population’s eyes, and alleviating the fear of the local community.</p>
6. Penetrate the insurgent organization	<p>Paget suggests that if this can be accomplished, an insurgent organization can be quickly dismantled. McCormick would suggest this is impossible without an effective campaign that targets the population (who will expose the organization and allow state forces to gain knowledge on it) and the insurgency’s support structure (if members of the insurgency believe they are isolated from the population and that the state will win, they may be willing to defect). As applied to air base defense this may have limited utility but only if AFOSI is separated from the core base defense mission. Penetrating an insurgent organization is a possible AFOSI mission but only as a part of larger strategy of a single defense force commander. However, penetration of other “friendly” institutions is also necessary. This is particularly important when it pertains to other forces involved in the base defense mission (indigenous base defense, police, and local military forces) and locals with political power such as a strongman, warlord, etc. US forces, whether in a lead or supporting role, must know where the loyalties of the other base defense organizations lie.</p>

Paget's Principles of Intelligence for Counterinsurgency were analyzed in 1992 by RAND as a basis for a strategic framework for countering terrorism and insurgency. RAND's research showed that Paget's third, fourth, and fifth principle (McCormick's Strategy A for the state) were most predictive of a successful counterinsurgency. This would suggest that implementing Strategy A through the unified Military-Civil-Police command structure (Paget's third principle) would be the optimal basis for counterinsurgency doctrine. And, if insurgents and terrorists are the real threat to air bases, the counterinsurgency strategy of intelligence and population security should be the basis for air base defense doctrine as well.

APPENDIX C. NEW PRINCIPLES OF AIR BASE DEFENSE BASED ON A COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL*

<u>Principles</u>	<u>Ways</u>	<u>Means</u>	<u>Ends</u>
Act First	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAF assumes that air base operations will attract attention of local and transnational insurgents and terrorists • Employ counter-insurgent air base defense tactics (Protection and Penetration) before or no later than the arrival of US aircraft. This includes Operational Preparation of the Environment, Training and Assistance, and Advanced Force Operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US military forces that are capable of training and liaising with base defense forces as well as local police, military, and militia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insurgent initial operating space is compressed • Insurgent must expend more effort and resources to attack the base or choose not to attack at all • Insurgents unable to fight information war • US level of effort is immediately apparent to the public, position of strength and dedication is first impression
Unity of Effort	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Objective • Integrated Intelligence • US/Allies Unity of Command – US and allies should strive to achieve a unified command structure • Small unit action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US training and assistance to indigenous forces • Sharing of intelligence • Aligning US and indigenous command structure so forces act cohesively • US air base commander liaison with local military and political leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Denies sanctuary for the insurgent • Situational awareness for base defense forces • Information and Intelligence can be viewed through the sphere of local knowledge and local contacts • Allows counter-insurgent forces to operate at a pace

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> that the insurgents cannot match • Establishes trust
Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence • Intervention and Conflict Resolution • Train and Advise Indigenous Forces • Restraint • Precise and Deliberate Force • Civic Action • Force Protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US training and assistance to indigenous forces • 24/7 operations throughout the area that is to be secured • Must “act” at the lowest level to protect the base and community against the acts of insurgents, criminals, dangerous incidents, etc. • As policemen are taught, force must be appropriate to the situation • Deliberate and discriminate force must always be applied against insurgent force • Local knowledge and situational awareness develops into local action • Monitor (and assist) training of indigenous emergency responders and ensure proper execution of any project associated with the air base • Provide competent technical assistance when requested • Offensive actions protects US forces • No risk avoidance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attacks insurgent center of gravity as base defense forces look like the “winner” • Denies sanctuary to the insurgent • Defense forces viewed as moral force • Public receptive to providing information on enemy activity • Disrupts insurgent system of growth • Efficiency of action as more of the defense is burdened by the indigenous forces • Protects friendly center of gravity – US public support • Minimizes US casualties
Penetration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Friendly forces • Local political officials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AFOSI establishes a network to ensure indigenous politicians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exposes the insurgent to discriminate force

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population • Insurgent organization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> are not intentionally hindering friendly operations or supporting enemy operations • Defense forces execute a plan to gather information from the population to expose insurgent infrastructure and leaders as well as other deceptive friendly forces • Implement IO and tactical PSYOP operations to influence public information • Police-type patrols penetrate population through observation, conversation, and field interviews • Distributed and continuous surveillance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> of base defense forces • Situational Awareness • Force Protection • Denies insurgent sanctuary • Disrupts insurgent system of growth • Detects insurgent attempts to manipulate information among the population • Allows evaluation of indigenous forces and political leaders • Provides critical information to develop measures of effectiveness (MOE)
Perseverance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air base operations often last for years • The defense effort must start before the air base operation and may not end until long after the completion of the air base mission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dedication of US forces to the defense • US training and assistance to indigenous forces • Acceptance of Risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US level of effort is immediately apparent to the public, position of strength and dedication is first impression • Denies sanctuary for the insurgent • Defense forces viewed as moral force

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APPENDIX D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR AIR BASE DEFENSE

Since the insurgent has been determined to be the true threat to air bases and this study has proposed the use of counterinsurgency models as a way of achieving local security for air base operations, how do we measure our effectiveness in defending the base? In defending the local area? The focus of any metric about air base defense should be on first – limiting damage to US personnel and resources (protecting the US COG), second - dissuading an attack (informational victory), third - disrupting a planned attack (informational victory), and fourth – attitude of the population. The thesis will offer a new way of looking at how to measure air base defense success based on a compilation of metrics proposed for counterinsurgency by Stephen Basilici and Jeremy Simmons in their thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School and by Andrew Krepinevich in his March 2005 testimony before Congress:²²¹

Air Base Attacks	<p><i>This is the most critical metric</i> because it speaks to the information war that is waged every time a US air base is attacked. Number of attacks must be considered along with the intensity of attack. A more aggressive attack speaks to the intent and probability of a growing insurgency. Of critical importance are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- US casualties- Damage to US resources- Number of attacks- Intensity of attacks (tactics employed) <p>Although in Iraq and Vietnam, air base attacks may have attained some semblance of routine, the Air Force operates almost continuously around the world and a single attack could have a devastating impact on an operation of less political importance such as peacekeeping, natural disaster response, and the GWOT (USAF air bases are located throughout Southwest, Central, and Southeast Asia)</p>
Enemy Activity in Local Area	<p>This is only slightly less important as air base attacks because these enemy activities normally do not kill US personnel or destroy US assets but instead target locals. However, affecting the US air base operation is often the intent of the attacks or a future objective of the enemy. Of critical importance are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Local casualties

²²¹ Krepinevich, testimony before Congree, p. 9-14; Basilici and Simmons, “Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare,” 37-38.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assassinations and targets - Intimidation of local officials - Kidnapping, hijackings of local contractors/workers, etc. - Attacks against Police/Military (number, tactics employed, and intensity)
Morale and Opinion	<p>These measurements are important because if done properly these can demonstrate the political preferences of the population and who they view as the winner in the struggle (i.e., hearts and minds). Also, these can show attitudes of local allies and how the public views them. Also of critical importance are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Allied units morale, desertion rates - Enemy morale, desertion and defection rates (often hard to measure) - Public's attitude towards US - Public's attitude toward local police/military - Public's attitude towards insurgent
Intelligence	<p>These measurements serve to determine if the US and allies are able to achieve situational awareness by protecting and penetrating the local population. Of critical importance are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Initiation of contact (% of US compared to enemy) - % IED's intercepted/destroyed versus detonated - % of engagements initiated by indigenous forces (police/military/militia) - Frequency of actionable intelligence provided by locals. This should be seen as percentage of contacts with the enemy as a result of local intelligence. Speaks to winning the information war at the local level.
Market Metrics	<p>This speaks to the ability of the insurgents to recruit and how attractive their cause is to the local populace. An example is if the insurgents must pay locals to set IEDs or participate in an ambush...the higher the price, the less people are willing to support the insurgent. Moreover, if the insurgents have to pay for fighters than this is a weakness that the US (and in the case of air base defense, AFOSI) can exploit.</p>

Measures of effectiveness must be established from the beginning of any air base defense mission because they are critical in determining the changing nature of the local security environment. It may also be advantageous to include criminal activity of a certain nature (weapons, munitions, organized, etc.) especially in areas where criminal

activity represents an insurgent-like threat or are used to fund insurgent activity, such as in Latin America.²²²

²²² Max Manwaring, *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency*, (2005). Retrieved on 11 Jan 2005 from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi>

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